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Introduction 
This research1 seeks to examine the relationship between 
political and military institutions in Syria from the French 
evacuation and Syrian independence in 1946 until the 1963 coup 
d’état when the military seized power. While the coup initially 
had a civilian front, it immediately became apparent that it was 
unequivocally militaristic. Furthermore, the research sheds light 
on the impact of the French mandate on the following period of 
Syrian history, as most post-independence political parties, as 
well as the core of the Syrian military, were formed during this 
period. By taking state formation as a starting point, this research 
aims to provide a better understanding of the relationship 
between military and politics in subsequent stages, an issue that 
is both old and new.  
The problematic relationship between the military and 
politics is underscored by the blurred boundaries between these 
institutions, where collaboration and interferences are common. 
The study first examines the pattern of cooperation and overlap, 
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through which politicians built military alliances and 
collaborated with the army several times to assume power and 
advance political and partisan interests. Political parties had 
loyalist military blocs that subscribed to their respective party’s 
ideologies and supported their political goals. This contributed 
to the transformation of the army into an arena that reflected, as 
well as reinforced, political conflict. Moreover, political 
orientations varied within the military, where personnel were 
both ambitious and held influence over political decisions. The 
army thus moved beyond its primary role of protecting the 
country from external aggression and failed to preserve its 
neutrality towards institutions of civilian rule. As a result, a 
mutually beneficial relationship materialised, with each 
institution recruiting followers from the other and expanding its 
patronage networks. Alliances and interferences ensued, where 
politicians used their connections in the military to further their 
interests, and vice versa. 
The study then explores the competitive and conflicting 
relationship between the military and politics, which led to a 
series of exclusions and purges that exhausted and weakened 
both institutions. The army often challenged the legitimacy of 
the political authority, its political, social and economic 
orientations, as well as its position on international and regional 
conflicts. The army repeatedly intervened in politics and 
Narratives of Transformation  54 
 
imposed its views on decision-making institutions, disrupted 
their work, or staged military coups. In alignment with party 
interests, some politicians attempted to curtail the power of the 
military and weaken its blocs, while others saw the army as a 
tool to wield power, and chose to bring it to their side rather than 
antagonize it. 
There are few studies that explore the relationship between 
military and politics in Syria during this time period. The most 
prominent are the works of Torrey (1964), Owen (1978), and 
Van Dusen (1971) which examine the role of the military in 
politics, the formulation of the two institutions, the social 
background of their members and the conflict between them. 
The remaining the studies fall into two categories. The first 
either has a solely historic or political approach, as in the study 
of Kamal Deeb (2011) on the contemporary history of Syria, the 
works of Uthman (2001) and Ferzat (2019) on political parties 
in Syria, and Seale (1989) and Van Dam (1995) on the struggle 
for power in Syria. These studies focus on political events in 
historical context without analysing the discourses each side 
used to legitimise its own practices. Furthermore, these studies 
examine political parties and the military more so than their 
interactive relationship and structural interests. 
The second category, on the other hand, has a socio-historic 
analytical approach. Some studies are based on a Marxist 
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approach, such as the works of Abdullah Hanna (1973; 2011) on 
Syrian political parties. Others are based on approaches inspired 
by Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, as in the works of Batato (2014) 
and Khoury (1993; 1997) which base their analyses on the 
narrative history of the elite’s origins and development, and on 
class and ethno-religious conflict. Moreover, some of these 
studies focus on a particular elite, including the works of 
Hinnebush (1990; 2011) and Rabinovich (1972) that examine 
the Ba’ath Party and Syrian Army during the Ba’athist period. 
The study builds on existing informative and analytical 
works, and introduces a new layer of testimonies from social 
actors, in both political and military fields, through the use of 
their memoirs. This forms a link between historical, political, 
social and personal readings of this period. The study highlights 
the role of social actors in important events and reviews their 
speeches in an effort to better understand the choices they made. 
Furthermore, the research traces the origins of the relationship 
between political institutions, including parties and leaders in 
power and in opposition, and military institutions represented by 
army officers and military blocs, aiming to form a nexus 
between political and historical studies, memoirs and archives. 
The study is composed of three chapters. The first chapter 
examines the structure of prominent political and military elites 
that occupied the forefront of Syrian politics post-independence. 
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It reviews the historical context in which the elite originated, the 
environments in which they were active, the classes they 
targeted, and the class, cultural and ideological composition of 
their leaders, in order to understand their choice of alliances and 
struggles. Three elites are examined, starting with the traditional 
ruling elite represented by the National Bloc which later split 
into two parties, the National Party and the People’s Party. 
Second is the emerging ideological elite and their associated 
parties that formed following the decline of the traditional elite 
whose discourse had failed to adapt to societal changes. Parties 
chosen for the study include the League of Nationalist Action, 
the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, the Syrian Social Nationalist 
Party, the Syrian Communist Party, and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Third is the military elite that played a pivotal role 
in Syrian political life during this period. The study categorizes 
this elite into two generations: the first generation was formed 
prior to independence within the framework of the French 
military establishment, and the second was formed after 
independence within the national military establishment. 
The second chapter examines the changing alliances among 
these three elites. It looks at the grounds for alliance and 
highlights the role of local affiliations, loyalties and political 
interests in moulding these alliances. It also examines the 
divisions and blocs that formed following internal dissent on 
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social and agriculture issues, corruption, wealth distribution, the 
republican system, and support for the army. There was further 
disagreement surrounding foreign affairs, most importantly on 
the nature of Arab unity, Western political involvement and 
conspiracies, and cooperation with regional and international 
axes with interests in Syria. The section explores how the 
emerging ideological and military elites wove their alliances and 
cemented their legitimacy to challenge the traditional elite based 
on a discourse that adopted issues of modernity, the social issue 
and a clear stance towards external aggression. Finally, it 
examines the impact of internal and external factors on political 
stability in Syria, the rise of left-wing politics, and the union with 
Egypt. 
The final chapter examines the political deployment of the 
military, the militaristic deployment of politicians and vice 
versa, how the military built a discourse that legitimized its 
intervention in politics, and the backdrop to the accusatory 
discourse exchanged between civilian politicians and the 
military. The section sheds light on the role of exclusions and 
purges that were carried out on a political-partisan basis or with 
a revenge-interest agenda in the collapse of political and military 
institutions. The section then examines how these circumstances 
paved the way for the Ba’ath’s rise to power in the 1960s, as it 
worked on the integration of military institutions into the party’s 
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cadres and established an ideological army. The party was only 
able to put an end to the tense relationship between politicians 
and the military after the civilian wing of the Ba’ath was 
excluded and the military wing assumed leadership. Finally, the 
section looks at how and why the formation of blocs and factions 
within the military took place on a clannist-sectarian basis, after 
they had previously been on a political-ideological basis. This 
led to a series of coups and coup attempts that lasted until a new 
period of rule began in 1970. While the following period was 
more stable as the government effectively prevented military 
coups, it did so by suspending political pluralism, thus hindering 
the creation of a modern democratic state. 
The study adopts a socio-political and economic approach to 
examining the structures, discourses and practices of the elite by 
linking them to local, regional and international historical 
contexts. It relies on primary resources including documents, 
speeches, memoirs and political writings of politicians and the 
military. It also utilizes secondary resources that examine this 
period in Syrian history. The study aims to provide answers to 
the following questions: is the competition and conflict between 
the military and political elites attributed to social-class factors, 
political-ideological factors, or is it simply a struggle for power 
and influence? What made institutions of the Syrian Army 
vulnerable to factionalism and bloc formation at times on a 
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partisan-political basis, and at others on a clannist-sectarian 
basis? And finally, did military intervention in politics 
contribute to the failure of building a state with a pluralistic, 
democratic, and stable political system, or did the failure to 
establish such a state contribute to the army’s rebellion and 
intervention in politics? 
This study will be published in three parts. The first discusses 
the sociocultural-ideological composition of the Syrian elites, 
while the second and third parts discuss subsequent alliances and 
divisions, the crisis of political instability and military 
intervention in politics and vice versa. 
 
1. Sociocultural and Ideological Composition of the Syrian 
Elite 
1.1. Traditional Ruling Elite 
The traditional elite that led the struggle for independence, and 
later ruled over Syria, were mainly descended from members of 
the pan-Arab nationalist faction of landowning bureaucrats; 
those who entered an ideological struggle, rather than a class 
struggle, with fellow members of their class as they competed 
for positions in the Ottoman state following the events of 1860.2 
Conflict arose surrounding the administration and distribution of 
privileges amongst themselves. Following the coup of 1908,3 the 
countercoup of 19094and the ensuing Turkification policies, the 
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elite split up into a pan-Arab nationalist-oriented group that fell 
short of opportunities in the Ottoman state, and a group that 
remained loyal to the Ottoman state. The ideologies of the latter 
subsequently shifted with the changing tides and interests 
following the arrival of King Faisal bin Hussein’s forces5 in 
Syria in 1918 to establish the United Arab State and proclaim 
independence from the Ottoman Empire. 
A liberal pan-Arab nationalist elite had begun to take form 
since the early 20th century. They were influenced by the 19th 
century rise of European nationalism that was promulgated by 
foreign schools and missionaries and was supported by the 
interests of the growing Syrian commercial society and 
European commercial organisations. This elite was composed of 
members of the feudal class, large urban and rural families, the 
new aristocracy from various sects, members of the General 
Assembly, and independent professionals and students in places 
such as Istanbul and Paris.6 Under these circumstances, the new 
nationalist thought was born, and on its margins, national blocs 
and independence parties were formed.7 
Early party formations appeared under the Arab constitutional 
government (1918-1920), the majority of which advocated for 
pan-Arab nationalism. These included the Young Arab Society 
(Al-Fatat), the Arab Independence Party, and the Syrian 
Covenant Society (Al-‘Ahd) which were composed of Syrians 
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and Arabs from Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine. Others, such as the 
Syrian Unionist Party and the Syrian National Party, limited their 
agendas to Syria while advocating for stronger nationalist and 
cultural ties with Arab peoples, as they believed the new Syrian 
state to be part of a wider nation. Following French occupation 
and the granting of freedom of association, the first Syrian 
political party, the People’s Party, was formed. It was founded 
by Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar and Damascene figures Fakhri 
al-Baroudi, Ihsan al-Sharif, Nazih Muayyad al-Azm, Faris al-
Khoury, Hassan al-Hakim and Saeed Haidar. The political 
agenda was announced at the founding conference on June 5, 
1925, aiming to unite nationalist ranks into a leading political 
organisation. The National Bloc was created towards the end of 
1926 following the declaration of the French High 
Commissioner for Syria and Lebanon, Henri Ponsot, to discuss 
France’s mandatory role. A conference led by Hashim Al-Atassi 
was held in Beirut in October 1927, calling for a clarification of 
the role of French protection.8 The National Bloc started to 
expand as nationalist exiles were allowed to return to Syria 
following the 1928 amnesty.9 The party laid down its founding 
principles at the Homs conference in November 1932, 
demanding unity of Syrian lands. 
There were several reasons behind the formation of the 
National Bloc and its prevalence in Syrian politics. The first 
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related to rising concerns over regional conditions of 
fragmentation, the erection of customs barriers between 
countries of the Arab Mashreq, subsequent changes in economic 
relations, and trends of industrial and commercial movements. 
This drove people of commerce, industry, and agriculture, who 
hailed from major urban and rural landowning families, to band 
together in order to preserve their interests against foreign 
companies that had been granted access to the country by the 
mandate. The second reason was that the elite were worried 
about the French creating cadres of employees that would 
challenge their social and political standing. In order to appease 
the elite and contain any notions of rebellion, the mandate 
administration chose to promote Syrian products, the Syrian 
economy, and the establishment of companies run by the elite. 
The third reason was that national elite leaders noticed a shift in 
French policy and perceived an increased possibility that France 
would sign the treaty of 1936.10 Finally, the elite leadership had 
to unite in light of Hashemites and Saudis vying for influence 
over political streams. They moved to protect Syrian interests, 
reinforcing their role in domestic politics, as more Arab regions 
moved towards forming independent states.11 
Following the 1943 parliamentary elections, opposition to the 
National Bloc began to form. This opposition was made up of 
two political streams. Members of the first stream belonged to 
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the same class and intellectual background as the ruling elite, but 
diverged on internal and external policies. Some were 
parliamentary candidates, and others were members of 
parliament aspiring to become ministers. This stream was 
headed by Nazim al-Qudsi (1905-1998) and Rushdi al-Kikhya 
(1899-1988), two national figures from the upper bourgeois 
families of Aleppo. They both began their political careers with 
the National Bloc and exited the party in 1938-1939 after 
negotiations with France on the ratification of the 1936 Treaty 
fell through. Al-Qudsi and Kikhya became the figureheads of 
parliamentary opposition until 1949. In 1945, they formed the 
Constitutional Front in parliament, which later became the 
People's Party in 1948. The Constitutional Bloc represented 
parliamentary opposition to the pro-government National Bloc. 
Neither bloc had a clearly defined agenda or an official list of 
members. It was thus difficult to discern different bloc members 
unless they provided explicit statements of positionality.12 
Members of the second stream belonged to the smaller 
landowning class and were fundamentally opposed to the ideas 
and policies of the ruling elite. The majority were educated youth 
with ambitions for power and to make changes to government 
policies. Most notable among them was Akram al-Hourani 
(1911-1996), who came from a middle-class landowning family 
that had squandered its fortune. 
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Political blocs and parties of the traditional elite developed as 
well-known figures of social and political status joined. 
Relationships within the party were built on familial and 
neighbourhood ties, kinship, marriage, school friendships, and 
previous participation in national organizations and associations. 
They lacked party organization and discipline, and remained 
closed to outsiders. In effect, they were an exclusive circle of 
elite families who possessed and exercised social, economic, and 
political power. 
The National Bloc, like the People's Party before it, was a 
homogeneous group. More than 90 percent of its leaders were 
Sunni residents of inner cities, mainly Damascus, Aleppo, 
Homs, and Hama. Over 60 percent were either landowning 
bureaucrats or educated landowners from the traditional upper 
class. Moreover, 25 percent came from wealthy or middle-class 
merchant families, while only 10 percent were of the landless 
employee class.13  
Members of this elite were highly educated and well-
equipped for political and administrative positions. Most of them 
received a secular education in politics, law, administration, and 
medicine at universities in Istanbul and Europe, or the Syrian 
Protestant College in Beirut. They thus obtained considerable 
cultural capital that reinforced their financial capital, and vice 
versa. The large income they received from land rent enabled 
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them to dedicate time to studies and travel. Only those with 
financial capital were able to acquire cultural capital that they 
would subsequently utilize to reinforce their financial capital, 
power, and property. It is worth noting that members of these 
parties were of similar age groups, and therefore of the same 
generation. As for their diverse origins, which included Arab, 
Turkish and Kurdish, these notions were overshadowed by the 
choice of Arabism as both an ideology and an identity. To 
demonstrate, the National Bloc hailed from early pan-Arab 
national societies, such as the Young Arab Society, that defended 
the Arab identity. 
These common sociocultural and intellectual environments 
generated similar interests among the affluent and educated class 
elite. These included reading, collecting books, poetry, music, 
art, traveling, fashion, and an affinity for foreign languages. 
Following independence in 1946, three main political blocs 
formed in parliament in 1947. The first was the National Party 
which grew from the remnants of the National Bloc. Members 
of the Bloc called for a conference in April 1947 in Damascus, 
during which the National Party was established. Saad Allah al-
Jabiri was chosen for party leadership. He was succeeded upon 
his death by Nabih al-Azma, who resigned in 1948, with Abd al-
Rahman al-Kayyali assuming party leadership. The party had 
offices in the provinces and primarily included Damascene 
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leaders in addition to a few leaders from Aleppo. The party 
thereby reflected Damascene politics, culture, and the local 
social environment in its narrowest form. The party also enjoyed 
the support of industrialists, big businessmen, and landowners. 
Its connection to the people was on a personal, rather than a 
partisan, basis. The party’s success in elections was in large part 
due to a network of patronage stemming from the relations, 
reputation, position, wealth, and national records of its leaders. 
Influence was tied to neighbourhood relations, marriages, and 
kinships among its members. Rather than competing based on 
political programs and agendas, leaders running for elections 
relied on the support of qabadayat (henchmen). That is, they 
used their power, prestige, and reputation to rally local 
influential networks. 
The second political bloc to emerge post-independence was 
the People’s Party, founded during the 1948 Constitutional Bloc 
conference in Lebanon. Its founding members were Nazim al-
Qudsi and Rushdi al-Kikhya, two former members of the 
National Bloc. The party was made up of conservative 
landowners, wealthy individuals, and a centrist intelligentsia. It 
represented the commercial and agricultural interests of Aleppo 
and the northern region,14 believing agriculture to be critical to 
economic success. It set provisions for determining future 
ownership that safeguarded against any retroactive effects. This 
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indicated a clear consideration for the interests of senior party 
members and provincial supporters.15 The party gained the 
support of the enlightened Aleppian liberal and Islamist elite, 
major landowners and most industrialists in Aleppo, as it 
encouraged industrial growth in the city.16 It also received 
support from the feudal al-Atassi family in Homs, which 
opposed the rule of Quwatli and Damascene politicians. 
The third bloc was formed by Jamil Mardam Bey, a 
nationalist leader who gathered independent representatives into 
a parliamentary bloc he called the Republican Bloc. It included 
around forty representatives of districts and small cities. 
According to Muhammad Harb Farzat, this clearly demonstrates 
the prevalence of personal interests over the public interest under 
critical international circumstances.17 
Table 1 illustrates the social, cultural, and political 
composition of members of the traditional Syrian elite in terms 
of their family and social class, religion and origin, schools and 
universities they attended, cultural interests, and political 
affiliations. 
 
Table 1: The social, cultural, and political composition of the 
traditional ruling elite.18 
 
Name Social Composition Cultural Composition 





























































































































































































































He was a 











































































































































































































































































































































1.2. Emerging Ideological Elite 
A new elite emerged after economic and social transformations 
weakened the traditional ruling elite, with programs and agendas 
aimed to change the existing social order. It included those from 
middle class commercial backgrounds, mid-level state 
bureaucracy, professionals, and nascent industrial bourgeoisie.19 
During their studies abroad, they were influenced by European 
culture and acquired new methods of political organisation. The 
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political parties they subsequently formed were based on sound 
ideologies that emphasized social and economic justice for the 
masses and challenged the National Bloc’s monopoly on 
politics. This elite that emerged under the French mandate did 
not form within the framework of a centralized nation-state, nor 
was it the result of an expanding powerful bourgeois class. 
Rather, it took advantage of the declining role and influence of 
the traditional-liberal elite. Knowledge, modernity, and a 
mission to change the political system were the driving force 
behind this emerging elite and the source of its legitimacy. 
Public outcry against the establishment of a Syrian state under 
the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and British support for the 
establishment of the State of Israel in Palestine, played a key role 
in the emergence and expansion of ideological parties in Syria 
and the region. These parties were formed by members of the 
emerging middle class who had studied in Europe and were 
influenced by ideas of nationalism, Marxism, and national 
liberation movements that dominated global political and 
cultural scenes in the early twentieth century. This is evident in 
the fact that leaders of emerging parties belonged to an elite 
group of intellectuals that included political theorists. The most 
prominent of these parties were: The League of Nationalist 
Action; the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party; Syrian Social 
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Nationalist Party; Syrian Communist Party; and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. 
  
1.2.1. The League of Nationalist Action 
This was the first political party with an Arab nationalist 
orientation. Syria suffered economic depression from 1930 to 
1934,20 and faced problems in marketing, trade and industry 
resulting from the depreciation of the French franc. The country 
also suffered from decline in export products intended for 
Europe and the Americas, a drastic fall in remittances, and the 
inability of Syrians from all professions to pay their debts. Many 
commercial and financial institutions went bankrupt.21 These 
circumstances negatively impacted the popularity of the 
National Bloc, who still favoured a strategy of honourable 
cooperation with France and failed to promote any social or 
economic reform program to counteract the effects of the crises. 
Around fifty Arab nationalist intellectuals22 gathered in the 
Lebanese village of Qarnayel, near Chtoura, with a mission to 
organise and coordinate national independence movements in 
the Arab region. They announced the establishment of the 
League of Nationalist Action, a new political organisation based 
in Damascus that would coordinate with similar parties in the 
region.23 
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The League’s stated goal was to achieve Arab sovereignty, 
independence, and unity. It focused on the importance of 
economic growth and unification in the struggle against 
colonialism and feudalism. Philip Khoury argues that the League 
adopted neither socialism nor Marxism-Leninism. Instead, 
national struggle replaced class struggle. It was a reformist 
movement, popular in some respects, and leaned towards 
centralisation.24 
Because the League was largely composed of youth and 
lacked political organisation among urban masses, it failed to 
challenge the National Bloc. The League thereafter sought to 
build a political base in Damascus and other cities, particularly 
among young people frustrated with the honourable cooperation 
policy of the National Bloc. These included graduates of public 
high schools, such as al-Tajheez School, where educators 
predominantly taught Arab nationalism. 
The League encompassed the second generation of Syrian 
nationalists and was influential among the younger intellectual 
elite of the 1930s, with its members having an average age of 29. 
Most of its leaders were lawyers25 who had completed their 
higher education in Europe, mainly France, or at the Syrian 
University in Damascus. There was therefore a marked cultural 
difference between leaders of the League and those of the 
National Bloc. While the latter were influenced by a 
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combination of Ottoman-Arab and European cultures, the 
former had a stronger Arab disposition and modern Western 
influences. 
The League leadership was diverse in terms of class and 
origin. It was composed of middle-class professionals, 
merchants, and employees. A minority belonged to poor 
branches of large landowning families or did not own land. They 
stood in contrast to leaders of the National Bloc who hailed from 
urban landowning families. The League had a strong presence in 
Homs due to the support of Hashim al-Atassi. Moreover, it 
garnered the support of the Greek Orthodox community in Homs 
who considered itself Syrian Arab. 
The League organized itself along the lines of a modern 
political party. It had a central political council, membership 
fees, a political program and published a weekly political 
newspaper called The Nationalist Action. However, it remained 
distinctly elitist and did not appeal to the masses. 
 
1.2.2. The Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party 
The League of Nationalist Action laid the ideological and 
organisational foundations of radical Arabism, which the Ba’ath 
built on after independence. The Ba’ath Party did not emerge as 
a single coherent party but was comprised of four political 
streams with distinct ideologies.26 Each stream bolstered the 
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Ba’ath Party with its supporters and followers from various 
social backgrounds. 
The first political movement formed in the early 1940s, when 
students and young intellectuals began to rally around Michel 
Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, two educators at al-Tajheez high 
school in Damascus who had studied at the Sorbonne in Paris. 
Aflaq studied literature and history, while al-Bitar studied 
physics. After their return to Damascus, they were active in their 
local communities and intellectual spheres. By relying on 
Damascus’s teachers, students, and intellectuals, Aflaq’s 
movement had purely intellectual beginnings. In their meetings, 
they discussed Arabism, decolonisation, and corruption among 
the ruling elite. Citing the Renaissance in Europe, they stressed 
the need for an Arab renaissance.27 Geographically, they 
primarily relied on the people of al-Midan neighbourhood in 
Damascus, as both their families were grain merchants in al-
Midan. Like most merchants in the neighbourhood, they had 
trade relations with the southern region that encompassed Horan 
and Jabal al-Arab. Aflaq’s friendship with Druze families 
contributed to Druze notables joining the Ba’ath leadership, 
including the al-Atrash family. Furthermore, the majority of 
Ba’ath Party members were from rural areas, who went to 
Damascus to continue their education. They belonged to 
religious minorities including Druze, Alawites, and Ismailis. 
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Sami al-Jundi, one of the early Ba’athists, asserts that most party 
affiliates in Damascus were young rural students who attended 
the university and high schools in the city between 1940-1955. 
Once they completed their studies, they returned to their 
hometowns where they continued to be active party members. 
Rural social conditions facilitated the emergence and expansion 
of the party in rural settings, while its presence remained weak 
in cities like Damascus.28 
The second political movement comprised students of Zaki 
al-Arsuzi, who hailed from a family of Alawite notables that fled 
Antioch after the annexation of Alexandretta by Turkey in 1938. 
He studied philosophy at the Sorbonne in Paris. Arsuzi is 
considered a founding member of the Ba’ath party, and has 
quarrelled with Aflaq over the title of ‘godfather’ and the 
antecedent use of the ‘Ba’ath’ name. After Arsuzi’s influence 
declined, he was succeeded as party leader by Wahib al-Ghanim, 
one of his most prominent supporters. Ghanim was also an 
Alawite from Alexandretta and came from a middle-class 
family.29 He studied medicine at the Sorbonne in Paris and 
opened a private clinic upon his return to Latakia in 1943. He 
established the Ba’ath Party in the city and found widespread 
support among poor and educated peasants.30 This was a left-
wing socialist political stream31 that demanded a secular state. 
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The third political movement was led by Jalal al-Sayyid, who 
came from a landowning tribal background.32 His father was a 
judge and a leader of the Khershan, the largest of the Deir al-Zur 
tribes.33 This stream rejected socialism, as it had a pan-Arab 
nationalist right-wing orientation that supported unity with Iraq, 
and was sympathetic to the Hashemites. This is attributed to 
prevalent blood ties and kinships between peoples of the eastern 
Syrian regions and Iraq, and by the distribution of tribal lands 
between the two countries. 
The fourth political movement joined the Ba’ath Party at a 
later stage. It was led by Akram al-Hourani who, at the beginning 
of his political career, had spent a year with the Syrian Social 
Nationalist Party. However, upon completion of his law degree 
at the University of Damascus, he returned to Hama in 1938 and 
joined the Youth Party founded by his cousin, Othman al-
Hourani. He was active against the National Bloc and its 
National Youth group. Hourani successfully mobilized peasants 
of Hama to end the political control of absentee landowners. His 
victory in the 1943 elections led to the introduction of the ‘social 
question’ in parliament for the first time. In 1951, he founded the 
left-wing Arab Socialist Party, which merged with the Arab 
Ba’ath Party in 1952 to form the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party and 
overthrow Adib al-Shishakli. Following the 5th National 
Congress of May 1962, Hourani and his loyalists were expelled 
Narratives of Transformation  82 
 
from the Party due to their nonconforming activities post-
secession from the United Arab Republic.34 Hourani and his 
party played a pivotal role in expanding the Ba’ath Party’s 
support base among popular classes and establishing strong ties 
with junior army officers. 
The spread of the Ba’ath from Damascus to other parts of 
Syria happened organically, without an explicit agenda or 
program of work. The expansion of the Ba’ath was, in large part, 
due to personal efforts and initiatives of early party members in 
their hometowns. The party grew in areas of Jabal al-Druze 
through Mansur al-Atrash, son of Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, leader 
of the Syrian Revolution in the 1920s, and in Homs through 
Jamal al-Atassi, a psychiatrist from the venerable Atassi family 
of Homs. 
 
1.2.3. Syrian Social Nationalist Party 
It was founded by Antoun Saadeh (1904-1949).35 Saadeh sought 
to establish a regional identity in the Arab Levant that 
transcended Arab and Islamic identities. He disagreed with the 
French-backed Maronite Lebanese Phalangist Party (Kataeb) 
who favoured the secession of Lebanon from Syria over 
Saadeh’s call for unity of all Syrian lands. The Syrian Social 
Nationalist Party found support among many ethnic, religious 
and sectarian minorities, especially in the Alawite Mountains, 
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and among non-Maronite Christians. Party ideals resonated with 
Levantine Christians, who saw the Arab Levant as their natural 
and historic home, based on national, geographic, and heritage 
ties. Saadeh called for secularism, reconciling sects, a central 
state, and a strong army, thereby transforming the Syrian idea 
into the form of a political party. The party was also popular 
among students, the petty bourgeoisie, and the army. However, 
Saadeh’s disagreement with Arab nationalists and communists 
weakened his popularity and expansion in cities influenced by 
Arabism, and later by Marxism, which attracted urban 
intellectuals and subsequent generations of emerging 
bourgeoisie. 
The Syrian Social Nationalist Party left its mark on parties 
that emerged after it, which adopted its method of organization, 
administration and ideological language. It also played an 
important role in politics and in the Syrian military 
establishment until 1955 when the party was accused of 
assassinating Colonel Adnan al-Malki. The party was 
consequently purged and outlawed.36 
1.2.4. Syrian Communist Party 
This party was active among high school students, self-
employed professionals, and workers in textile factories and 
railways. The party included many Armenians, Kurds and other 
minorities.37 It was led by Khalid Bakdash (1912-1995), who 
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was born in the Kurdish neighbourhood of Damascus, and is of 
Kurdish origin. After graduating from Maktab Anbar,38 Bakdash 
joined the Faculty of Law in Damascus, but was unable to 
continue his studies due to his persecution.39 During the early 
1930s, he was frequently arrested for his pro-Communist and 
anti-French activities.40 He worked at the Ministry of Finance in 
the tax stamp bandroll section, where there were special 
procedures for cigarettes and tobacco. He also worked as a 
superintendent in the Sahnawi factory in Bab Sharqi,41 and wrote 
and translated articles for al-Ayyam and al-Qabas newspapers. 
Bakdash devoted himself to political work after his release from 
prison in 1931. In 1933, he went to Moscow under party orders 
to study Marxism-Leninism and political economy at the 
Communist University of the Toilers of the East. During his two 
and a half year stay, he learned Russian and received an 
ideological education. In 1936, Bakdash returned to Syria and 
became Secretary of the Syrian Communist Party. That same 
year, he played a positive role in negotiations between the left-
wing Popular Front French government and the Syrian 
delegation in Paris. 
The Syrian Communist Party gained legitimacy during World 
War II, as Bakdash led national liberation activities, including 
underground resistance against Vichy France between 1940-
1941. According to Philip Khoury, Bakdash worked to establish 
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a “pragmatic” relationship with political and financial 
institutions in Syria. This pragmatic approach brought the party 
closer to Arab nationalism than to socialism.42 The party took 
part in popular unrest during the bread crisis and presented itself 
as a nationalist organization that defended the poor. 
Furthermore, the party was tactically pragmatic in its first 
alliances. Due to the absence of a Syrian working class, Bakdash 
strengthened relationships with al-Quwatli and other bourgeois 
leaders of the National Bloc to influence their decisions. He also 
reinforced ties with and received support from the French 
Communist Party. The Syrian Communist Party received a 
decisive blow when the Soviet Union voted at the United 
Nations in favour of establishing a Jewish state on November 29, 
1947 and recognized the State of Israel in May 1948. This was 
unjustifiable to the Syrian people who, at the onset of the first 
Arab-Israeli war, accused the party of supporting Soviet partition 
policy. The party was subsequently dissolved in January 1949 
and driven underground following Husni al-Za’im’s coup d’état 
in March 1949.43 
 
1.2.5. The Muslim Brotherhood 
The structural changes in Syria during the interwar years led to 
the creation of a rift in urban popular neighbourhoods. 
Traditional merchants and craftsmen suffered the brunt of trade 
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expansion with Europe, while workers suffered from poverty 
due to high inflation levels in the late 1930s. Moreover, drought 
and accumulated debts to landowners led to the displacement of 
farmers, who moved to cities in pursuit of work. They all looked 
to the national leadership for help who, in turn, ignored their 
problems and focused its efforts to build modern state 
institutions. According to Philip Khoury, this paved the way for 
the emergence of a radical political stream that challenged 
national leadership and called for a revolutionary response to the 
‘social question’. As the gap widened between traditional and 
modern sectors of society, popular classes became drawn to 
religious leaders and institutions that spoke a language they 
understood.44 Thereafter, Islamic associations began to emerge 
with an aim of meeting this class’s various needs. 
These associations began as religious charities during the 
French mandate. They were urban associations and most of their 
founders belonged to middle-class scholars, educators, doctors, 
lawyers, and judges, with some coming from middle-class 
merchant backgrounds.45 
During a conference held in Aleppo, the Shabab Muhammad 
and Dar al-Shuban al-Muslimeen societies were reorganized and 
merged to form the Muslim Brotherhood. A high central 
committee with a permanent office in Damascus was 
Narratives of Transformation  87 
 
established, and Mustafa al-Siba’i (1915-1964)46 was elected 
general observer of the Brotherhood in Syria and Lebanon. 
The Muslim Brotherhood garnered support among students 
because it had an active presence in education. The Brotherhood 
established private and religious schools, libraries, scientific 
missions, and scouts.47 Furthermore, they extended their 
influence over trade unions and craftsmen through worker 
committees that engaged in education, combating illiteracy, and 
organizing cultural events on Islam and Arabism.48 
The expansion of the Brotherhood was limited to major 
Syrian cities and adjacent towns and villages. Due to differing 
sectarian and ideological compositions, it failed to garner 
significant support among army ranks. The Brotherhood was 
restricted to Sunni Arabs, while the army included diverse sects 
and ethnicities. Moreover, the military was purged of 
Brotherhood supporters. The Muslim Brotherhood represented 
class interests of the lower middle classes and reflected their 
popular disposition. 
Table 2 illustrates the social, cultural, and political composition 
of prominent leaders and founders of emerging political parties. 
 
Table 2: The social, cultural and political composition of the 
emerging ideological elite.49 
Name Social Composition Cultural Composition 
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2. Military Elite 
Two generations of military elite played pivotal roles in Syrian 
political life between 1946-1963. The first generation formed 
within military frameworks established by France, then joined 
nationalist forces after the French attacked the Syrian Parliament 
on May 29, 1945, and dropped bombs on Damascus. These 
soldiers formed the core of the armed forces, and became part of 
the national military institution after independence. Some even 
managed to seize power following a series of military coups 
between 1949 and 1954 that overthrew civilian rule. The second 
generation, on the other hand, appeared after independence 
within the emergent national military establishment. Leftist and 
nationalist ideologies spread among them, and their 
susceptibility to politicisation increased following the 1948 
Palestine War and military coups. Loyalties of this generation 
were divided among the dominant ideologies in the political 
sphere. The various factions within the military thus became a 
reflection of political factions. After 1955, second generation 
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officers sought alliances with the emerging ideological elite that 
would overturn the socioeconomic order to weaken the power of 
the traditional elite. Their power and influence in the military 
and in politics became apparent during and after the union with 
Egypt. Ba’athists allied with Nasserist officers in the ‘Military 
Committee’, and then with independent civilians in the coup of 
March 8, 1963 to resolve the political and military conflict 
thereby seizing power. 
 
2.1. First Generation (Pre-Independence) 
When French forces evacuated Syria, they left the country with 
an army that was structurally built to serve French interests and 
hinder the formation of a national state capable of defending 
itself. The core of the Syrian Army developed from the Special 
Troops of the Levant (Troupes Speciales du Levant), after the 
French agreed to handover the armed forces and the gendarmerie 
on August 12, 1945.50 The Special Troops were comprised of 
volunteers from religious and ethnic minorities with a French 
leadership that was maintained until the end of the mandate.51 
The army was structured as such for two reasons. The French 
preferred to recruit people from religious minorities and clans 
distant from the capital, assuming they would not be influenced 
by sentiments of Arab nationalism. Moreover, the French would 
ensure their loyalties and use them as a tool of incitement in 
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accordance with colonial French minority-policy.52 The second 
reason related to high unemployment rates in mountainous 
regions and areas far from urban centres. This drove people to 
enrol in military academies and pursue a military career or seek 
public employment in order to obtain steady income and escape 
poverty and poor education. By joining the ranks of these forces 
these youths were more open to the modern world, learned order 
and discipline, acquired new ideas, and became familiar with the 
administration of a modern state, such as France. Some even 
learned to speak French. This stood in contrast to the attitudes of 
the upper-class landowning bureaucrats and urban middle 
classes who despised the military and refused to join under a 
colonial authority. Kamal Deeb asserts that this was a “historical 
mistake”53 committed by urban Sunni commercial families and 
rural landowners. 
Members of this first generation of military elite may have 
belonged to families of local notables that owned land and 
worked in agriculture or had prominent religious or social 
positions. However, their eminence was limited and non-
material. Their land and livestock did not provide for a life of 
luxury or financial well-being, and money was rather short and 
infrequent.54 For this generation, joining the ‘Army of the 
Levant’ or the Military Academy in Homs during the mandate 
was not an issue. They were educated in French institutions or in 
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local schools that were under the control of the French mandate 
and subject to its educational curricula. Some of them received 
an Ottoman education first, then continued their education under 
the French system. A considerable part of this elite was educated 
in schools of sectarian sub-states established by the French 
mandate, with each sub-state having its own unique curriculum. 
Table 3 provides an overview of the social, cultural, and political 
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Table 3: The social, cultural and political composition of the 
first generation of military elite.55 
Name 
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2.2. Second Generation (Post Independence) 
Following independence and the French handover of the army 
and the gendarmerie forces, the national government 
implemented a series of extensive reforms. These included 
dissolving sectarian and ethnic   military units left by the French 
mandate, improving financial support, and recruiting more 
soldiers in order to create a comprehensive national army. The 
government thereby regulated the armed forces, established the 
General Staff, military schools and academies, introduced 
compulsory service in 1948, and transformed the French 
Military Academy in Homs into a national military academy for 
the training of officers. 
The second generation of military elites included officers who 
graduated from the Military Academy in Homs after 
independence.56 They were militarily and intellectually moulded 
in national educational institutions and were ideologically 
informed.57 They joined various ideological political parties. 
This led to the formation of rival ideological groups and 
factionalism in the military establishment. 
Many changes in structure and composition distinguish this 
generation, which were in large part due to the annual increase 
in the number of army recruits. This is attributed to the large 
increase in the number of schools accessible to the lower classes 
in hundreds of villages and small cities. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
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army recruits numbered in the hundreds, with most coming from 
lower- and middle-class rural families. This trend indirectly led 
to an increase in the number of minority officers and former 
peasants.58 Hanna Batatu explains that, “… on the level of the 
officer corps the Alawis, contrary to a widespread impression, 
were not as important numerically as the Sunnis prior to 1963. 
They derived much of their real strength from the lower ranks of 
the army. In an arithmetical sense, they had a plurality among 
the common soldiers and a clear preponderance among the non-
commissioned officers.” This situation lasted until 1955.59 
Before the Ba’ath seized power in 1963, the most prominent 
military groups that held power and influence had been under 
the leadership of Sunni officers.60 A further explanation for the 
superior numbers of rural minorities among rank-and-file 
draftees, is the matter of the badal or ‘financial substitute’. 
Before 1964, Syrians were permitted to buy exemption from 
military service for 500 Syrian pounds.61 In the 1950s and 1960s, 
urban Sunnis, even those from humble backgrounds, could 
afford the required sum to avoid one-and-a-half to two years of 
compulsory service. However, for peasants, especially Alawites, 
500 pounds represented the value of several seasons of arduous 
labour. Not to mention, peasants were seldom free from debt.62 
After defeat in the Palestine War of 1948, the army’s 
resentment towards the ruling political elite increased. 
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Moreover, recurring coups and the spread of political awareness 
among the military, due to the expanding influence of emerging 
ideological parties within the ranks, led to the army’s 
reconfiguration. After al-Shishakli was deposed in the mid-
1950s, a younger, more politicized and radical generation of 
officers emerged, with the left-wing becoming dominant in both 
politics and the military. In early 1955, the army divided into 
several factions including the Ba’ath faction, the left-wing 
faction influenced by the Communist Party, Shishakli, the pro-
Iraq faction, the Syrian Nationalist Party faction, and the 
Damascene ‘Shwam’ officers faction that attracted independent 
officers, and conservative officers influenced by the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Independent ‘professional’ officers were also 
present. However, after the assassination of independent 
Damascene officer and Ba’ath sympathizer, Colonel Adnan al-
Maliki, in April 1955, the Social Nationalist Party faction, led by 
Ghassan Jadid, was purged from the army. The Damascene 
officers faction had lost its most important leader, Colonel al-
Maliki. Consequently, the army became polarized between two 
major blocs: The Socialist bloc, which included the prominent 
al-Hourani, and the Liberation ‘Tahrir’ bloc, which included 
officers of the Shishakli faction. Escalation of conflict between 
these two blocs in the mid-1950s threatened a schism in the 
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Syrian army in the midst of disintegration among Syrian political 
and social elites.63 
After unification with Egypt, the Damascene officers’ faction 
survived the wave of dissolutions that had swept military 
factions because it had distanced itself from ideological 
partisanship. This also gave Abdel Nasser reason to rely on the 
Damascene officers’ faction after relieving partisan officers from 
their positions of power. On September 28, 1961, a group of 
officers left the faction and joined Abd al-Karim al-Nahlawi in 
taking control of Damascus and proclaiming the secession of 
Syria from the United Arab Republic. They cited a lack of fair 
practices and sharp inequality between the two countries. After 
the dissolution, the army and politicians were divided between 
those loyal to Nasser and unification, and those who were in 
opposition. The Damascene officers’ faction was further 
weakened following a failed coup attempt that took place 
between March 28 and April 1, 1962. On March 8, 1963, the 
Ba’ath faction’s Military Committee allied with the Nasserist 
faction and independent officers, led by Ziad al-Hariri, to seize 
power. The following chapters will examine these factions and 
their relationships with each other and with other political 
parties. 
The Military Committee is one of the most prominent groups 
in the history of the Syrian Army. It is important in terms of its 
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composition, alliances, strategies, and its role and influence on 
the political history of Syria. This group was formed in secrecy 
in Egypt towards the end of 1959, during the union. The Arab 
Socialist Ba’ath Party had announced its dissolution on February 
23, 1958, the day after the declaration of unity with Egypt, in 
accordance with Nasser’s conditions. This angered many 
Ba’athist officers. Daniel Pipes argues that the Military 
Committee was thus innately rebellious against unity with Egypt 
and against the traditional leadership that approved party 
dissolution in return for personal gain and limited positions.64  
The Military Committee initially consisted of five officers, 
then grew to include fifteen members. Most of them came for 
rural middle classes or poor urban neighbourhoods. All of these 
officers attended public schools with an Arabised curriculum 
post-independence. Consequently, they acquired an Arab 
national identity and were not influenced by Western culture nor 
spoke foreign languages. They all graduated from the Military 
Academy in Homs after independence and joined the Ba’ath 
Party. 
After coming to power, this group of young officers turned 
the page on democracy and pluralism in Syria. They established 
a new system where the army and the party coexisted and formed 
alliances,65 and the state took on a new form which combined 
sectarianism and military rule with Leninist political 
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organization to implement the “revolution from above”.66 For 
the structure and composition of the Military Committee 
officers, see Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4: The social, cultural and political composition of the 
Military Committee officers.67 
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3. Alliances, Factions and the Crisis of Political Instability 
3.1. Struggle Over Legitimacy and the Social Question 
The traditional ruling elite broke into factions after Syria’s 
independence in 1946. While they had banded together against 
foreign French rule, they became locked in a state of political 
and social competition over the distribution of national wealth 
and defining political, social and economic orientations of the 
newly independent state. This permitted the emergence of a new 
political and military elite. They were mainly descended from 
urban and rural middle and lower classes, who were liberated by 
independence and given strong social, educational and health 
services. The discourse and activities of this new elite were 
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based on criticizing the ruling elite’s corruption and exploitation 
of state power to further their class and commercial interests. 
In 1944, opposition-led parliamentary debates led to the 
formation of a governmental investigation committee, rather 
than a parliamentary committee as had been requested by Akram 
Al-Hourani, to investigate allegations of corruption in the 
Ministry of Supply. The aim was to expose the corruption of the 
feudal and capitalist classes, which included members of 
Parliament, and those with interests linked to the political class. 
The outcome was the dismissal of the Minister of Supply, 
Mazhar Raslan, and the resignation of the al-Jabiri 
government.68 In his memoirs, Khaled al-Azm talks about how 
the deal of Sami Saem al-Daher led to a change of government. 
Al-Daher was a prominent textile and silk merchant from Aleppo 
who served as a member of Parliament from independence until 
Husni al-Za’im's coup.69 
The ruling elite avoided making socio-economic changes, 
particularly those that would affect agriculture. Since the ruling 
class was mostly composed of landowners, major families, 
notables and merchants they were eager to preserve their social 
status and power. The agrarian question remained a controversial 
issue after independence. According to estimates made by Samir 
Makdisi, 82 percent of the rural population before 1958 did not 
own agricultural land, or owned land with an area less than 10 
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hectares. In contrast, a very limited group of agricultural 
landowners (2.5 percent) owned 45 percent of artificially 
irrigated lands and 30 percent of naturally irrigated lands.70 
There were no major developments in agricultural land 
ownership in the years following independence beyond some 
growth in medium-scale agricultural land ownership and the 
consolidation of land ownership in a “modern” real estate 
registry.71 This was despite the economic growth that occurred 
following an increase in cultivated areas thanks to the 
mechanization of agriculture and the use of modern water 
pumps. Such developments required major funding from the 
urban bourgeoisie, who therefore became at the centre of 
agricultural activity and the main beneficiaries of this sector. 
The structure of the urban ruling class and its policies to 
secure its position established the city’s control over the 
countryside. They demanded that the state provide health and 
transportation services to their regions and jettisoned all political 
discussions on ownership. Urban political control over 
legislation became evident when Parliament issued a labour law 
in 1946 which did not refer to agricultural workers at all, even 
though they constituted the overwhelming majority of workers. 
In 1957, when some progressive members of parliament 
submitted a bill prohibiting landlords from evicting peasants 
from their homes, only 36 of the 144 members of parliament 
Narratives of Transformation  113 
 
voted in favour of the bill. However, the one-article law was 
adopted on March 4, 1957 because the majority opted for 
absenteeism instead of voting against the bill for fear of 
backlash.72 
The agrarian (peasant) issue in Syria remained problematic 
given the fact that a large portion of the ruling political class 
were urban agricultural landowners who owned part of the 
countryside surrounding the cities in which they resided. These 
landowners were either feudal political figures of Turkish origin, 
as in Hama, or city merchants who turned to invest in industrial 
agriculture, especially cotton, as in Aleppo and the Jazira region. 
Therefore, there was a clear class aspect to the relationship 
between landowners and peasants, in addition to differences in 
tribal and local loyalties.73 In the 1950s, Syria witnessed severe 
contention between the middle classes (representing the 
peasants) and major landowners who disagreed over the solution 
to the peasant problem. Middle class representatives, including 
members of the Arab Ba’ath Party, the Arab Socialist Party (al-
Hourani) and the Muslim Brotherhood, saw that the only 
solution to this problem was socialist agrarian reform. 
Landowners were able to use their positions to protect their 
ownerships only until the union with Egypt, after which 
agricultural land ceiling laws were enacted and nationalization 
projects were initiated. 
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Also contributing to the decline of the traditional elite and the 
rise of the ideological and military elites was the public’s deep 
rejection of the Syrian state that was drawn up in the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement, its amendments in San Remo, and the fixing of 
geopolitical borders in the Treaty of Lausanne. Moreover, the 
people rejected British policy that supported the establishment 
of the State of Israel in Palestine. The people disapproved of the 
way nationalists approached the issue of Palestine. During the 
Arab revolt in Palestine in the late 1930s, the National Bloc 
government provided cautious support. While the Palestinian 
cause was the most popular cause in Syria at the time, the 
government was wary of jeopardizing negotiations with Paris 
towards an agreement on independence. Later, during the 1948 
Palestine War, the national government failed to provide 
adequate supplies for the war effort, neither did it seek greater 
Arab coordination, nor did it adequately prepare the Syrian army 
for combat.74 
The defeat in the 1948 Palestine War sparked dispute over 
whether the ruling class or military negligence were responsible 
for the defeat. Opposition parties and the army launched a 
campaign against the government, blaming it for losing the war 
and holding it accountable.75 In particular, Defence Minister 
Ahmad al-Sharabati76 was accused of failing to arm the military, 
fragmenting it into competing factions, and reducing its numbers 
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through discharges. He was also accused of involvement in 
politics and interference in the elections. Conversely, during 
parliamentary discussions in March 1949 on the causes of defeat, 
Faisal al-Asali, leader of the Syrian Social Cooperative Party and 
ally to President Shukri al-Quwatli, demanded that army 
commander, Husni al-Za’im, be tried for treason and conspiring 
with King Abdullah. The government subsequently charged al-
Za’im with corruption, bribery and misconduct over defective 
weapons and rotten army provisions.77 Officer Antoun al-
Bustani was also accused of illicit enrichment because of his role 
in sending rotten food supplies to the army, including spoiled 
margarine. Prosecution of the army leader caused anger among 
the officers who considered these accusations to be an 
encroachment on the military establishment. This prompted a 
group of officers, led by Husni Al-Za’im, to send a letter of 
protest78 to the President calling for al-Asali to be arrested and 
tried for insulting the army. This was immediately followed by 
Husni al-Za’im’s coup on March 30, 1949.  
Anger towards the traditional ruling elite was prevalent in the 
army. They believed that for a confrontation with Israel to be 
successful it was necessary to eradicate the ruling elite, change 
social and economic conditions, eliminate feudalism, and tackle 
corruption. Akram al-Hourani adopted this viewpoint and so did 
many young low-ranking officers. The legitimacy of the ruling 
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elite, their corruption and approaches to foreign issues and the 
social question were points of convergence between the military 
and the emerging ideological parties. Some party leaders, such 
as al-Hourani and Khalid al-Azm, defended the army and 
advocated for increased support and armament. Al-Azm even 
played an important role in closing arms deals. Moreover, 
networks of alliances and patronages formulated between ruling 
political parties and the military, which facilitated cooperation 
whenever interests converged. Al-Azm described this military-
political convergence as “dual power”.79 He attributed its 
beginnings to Sami al-Hinnawi’s coup, where al-Atassi, al-
Kikhya, al-Qudsi, and al-Hourani approved al-Hinnawi’s 
appointment of al-Atassi as prime minister. This made it clear 
that the government no longer made decisions without first 
consulting with the military. Gordon H. Torrey also refers to the 
dual power that emerged following al-Hinnawi’s coup, where 
factions emerged between politicians and military officers 
aspiring to rule. Division and competition led to the duality of 
power in government which, in turn, became a point of conflict 
as neither politicians nor the military had full control. This also 
led to diminishing loyalties between ambitious members of both 
groups.80 
Just as the traditional ruling elite had sought cooperation with 
the military when their interests converged, so did the emerging 
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ideological parties, who had loyal groups and factions within the 
military establishment. In their beginnings, these coups were 
also supported by party and local leaders as well as the people. 
A new class of capitalist elites cooperated with the military, such 
as Aleppian businessman Muhammad Said al-Za’im who 
provided support for Adib al-Shishakli and was subsequently 
appointed Minister of Finance. 
Conversely, the politicization of some officers stemmed from 
their belief in the propositions of ideological parties that 
expressed common class and political interests. However, they 
were soon disillusioned and disappointed by squabbling party 
leaders. Such was the experience of Muhammad Umran with the 
Ba’ath Party. He recounts the reasons for his and his fellow 
officers’ involvement with the Ba’ath after graduating from the 
Military Academy in 1947, “The Ba’ath, at that time, was a 
movement that aroused a sense of hope among young people and 
was the practical embodiment of the aspirations of the new 
generation towards progress, after the traditional political parties 
had failed to realise the aspirations of this generation…For us, 
the Ba’ath represented not only hope, but also an expression of 
what we were looking for with our unbridled nationalist 
sentiments and our sense of social injustice perpetuated by the 
classes controlling the country.”81 He also explains how the 
military believed that supporting civilian party leaders would 
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hasten the achievement of social and economic party goals, 
strengthen resistance against colonial projects, and bring about 
an era of Arab unity. However, he goes on to underscore the 
disappointment of the military in party leaders’ contradictory 
ideas, bad political choices, and the prioritization of their own 
interests to rule. To illustrate, he describes the disappointment in 
Ba'ath officers who participated in the coup against al-Shishakli 
in 1954, “The military expected the party to come to power 
immediately after the coup. However, after trusting party 
political leaders to turn the coup in favour of liberal and 
democratic party ideals, we were shocked by the repudiation of 
all our expectations during the Homs Conference.”82 Political 
party leaders met in Homs to discuss the sharing of power, after 
which traditional parties resumed power. 
The military demanded that political elites establish a 
functional state apparatus, deprioritize their party interests, and 
adhere to the republican system. After al-Hinnawi’s coup and al-
Shishakli’s first coup, power was left to the politicians, while the 
military ruled from behind the scenes. However, party and 
ideological conflicts and ministerial crises prompted the military 
to stage further coups. 
The military saw itself as the only national institution that 
represented all segments of society and presented itself as a 
champion of the nation's unity and its goals. Consequently, the 
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military believed it their right to play a political role in the 
country as the protectors of national security and independence. 
The military was able to launch a series of coups because of the 
failure of civilian political authority to contain the military 
establishment, failure to neutralize it from interfering with 
politics, and the failure to approach it as one of the state 
institutions subject to the existing political system. It also 
launched the coups under the pretence of defending the 
republican system and saving the country from catastrophic 
party conflict. It took advantage of political instability caused by 
external regional factors and internal political factionalism. The 
strongman government therefore replaced a government of 
competing parties. 
The coups of the 1950s and 1960s were represented under the 
light of revolutionary movements. The old regimes had been 
removed, and the economic bases of social classes that had 
supported their rule were destroyed following policies of 
agrarian reform and nationalization. Thus, a new type of society 
developed.83 After the 1960s, marginalized groups had the 
opportunity to break out of the existing semi-democratic system. 
Urbanisation and the expansion of health and educational 
services after independence enabled the children of these groups 
to enter schools and military academies and to join radical 
parties. They were thus given the chance to participate in the 
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political game, and to acquire social status irrespective of their 
family, regional or tribal origins. 
Members of the Military Committee that participated in the 
1963 coup and took power after excluding their allies, had rural 
beginnings and shared similar rural orientations. The majority 
were medium and small size farmers, and a few belonged to 
merchant and industrialist classes. The latter were allocated to 
foreign diplomatic missions.84 The structure and composition of 
Military Committee officers impacted Syrian society. Unlike 
previous years, the peasant class began to expand its influence 
and rise economically and socially, until it became of equal 
standing with urban classes, and even asserting control over 
them in later stages.85 This socio-economic policy strengthened 
villagers to become economically self-sufficient and relatively 
independent from the cities.86 Consequently, this group came to 
control state bureaucracy. Batatu remarks that, “Members of this 
class brought their relatives, acquaintances, and members of 
their sects to attain employment in state institutions, and thus the 
rural population (Houran, Hama, Latakia mountains and Idlib) 
became the most represented segment in state bureaucracy.”87 
This contributed to a population increase in main cities, 
especially Damascus, following rural-urban migrations. Batatu 
attributes this to compulsory and professional military service, 
and the concentration of state agencies and their expanding 
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cadres in Damascus. These new circumstances arising after 1963 
prompted the expansion of rural influence and authority over the 
city, after rural classes had been marginalized and subject to the 
control of urban leaders and notables prior to and after 
independence. 
The transfer of power from the city to the countryside took 
place under the banner of socialism, which was adopted by the 
ruling military elite in 1963 and was the basis for their policies. 
However, this later resulted in the concentration of wealth in the 
hands of an oligarchy, and a pattern of wealth distribution that 
depended on kinship and loyalty to the regime. It also reflected 
the composition of the military elite and its desire for social 
ascendancy and access to power. 
 
3.2.  Clannism, Chieftaincy, and Interests as the Core of 
Alliances 
The National Bloc benefitted from the two-round electoral 
system (ballotage)88 that was adopted in 1943 to attain power. It 
invested in patronage networks within neighbourhoods and 
among peasants to guarantee electoral success for its 
representatives. The two-tier voting system was based on the so-
called “secondary voters” to elect “primary voters”, then those 
primary voters would elect members of parliament.89 This 
electoral system reinforced regionalism and sectarianism, and 
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helped families dominate political life. This is primarily due to 
the fact that this system restricted the right to vote to Syrian 
civilian males over the age of twenty, while granting special 
seats for minority sects and Bedouins. Bedouin seats are 
generally not held by elections but are chosen by the tribal 
sheikhs.90 Second, the election of primary voters was conducted 
in smaller districts, that is, the village or neighbourhood. In 
effect, primary voters did not form an absolute majority to secure 
the election of members of parliament. They often received sums 
of money from candidates and were subjected to pressures from 
large landowners in the countryside and other prominent figures. 
Furthermore, as primary voters were free to vote and not limited 
by the wishes of their secondary voters, the influence of the 
general Syrian population on the Syrian electorate was small and 
limited.91 
Therefore, the opposition led by Akram al-Hourani demanded 
that the election law be changed to direct elections, arguing that 
indirect elections disproportionately served the interests of the 
feudal class over those of peasants,92 and that secondary voters 
were few in number and easy to influence. These demands were 
accompanied by demonstrations and student protests that broke 
out in mid-April 1947, during which a civil strike took place in 
most major cities including Damascus, Homs, Hama, and 
Aleppo. A number of trade unions also participated in the strike, 
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as well as the General Union of Syrian Women which demanded 
granting women the right to vote.93 On the other hand, the 
National Bloc rejected any change in the electoral system in 
order to guarantee its seats. However, under increasing popular 
pressure, parliament approved a new election law providing for 
direct elections. After the election law was amended in 1947, al-
Hourani no longer needed to ally with the National Party, as he 
had done in 1943, to win the election. He therefore directed his 
efforts towards establishing a strong electoral base among the 
peasants. 
On the other hand, rivalry and competition among the 
traditional elite in the 1947 elections prompted a realignment of 
alliances. Al-Quwatli had failed to secure al-Jabiri’s support to 
renew his presidency for a second term, had lost support of al-
Gharaa Association and had fallen out with sheikhs and the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, al-Quwatli projected the 
advancement of the religious scholars’ ballot in the elections. 
This prompted him to side with landowners and seek the support 
of Jamil Mardam, promising him the office of prime minister. 
Jamil Mardam, in turn, enlisted the help of the military through 
Minister of Defence, Ahmad al-Sharabati. In an effort to subvert 
the ascension of Islamists, al-Sharabati rigged the 1947 
elections, using the military in civilian attire94 and army vehicles 
to transport voters.  
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The ruling elite was not alone in investing in local affiliations 
and family and regional clannism to further political interests 
and expand their influence. At a time when Sunni families 
dominated traditional party leaderships, such as the National 
Party and the People's Party, members of minority families either 
joined the army or progressive parties. They were influenced by 
the army’s and progressive parties’ appealing ideas, adoption of 
the peasant issue and alignment with their class interests. This 
led to the emergence of politically and militarily powerful 
families, whose members were dispersed across politics and the 
military and allied together whenever necessary. Such families 
include the Druze al-Atrash family,95 the Alawite Jadid family,96 
and the Christian al-Kallas family.97 This phenomenon was also 
present among Sunni families, including the al-Atassi family. 
The military elite, especially the first generation, tried to 
establish a chieftaincy centred on the authority of the military 
establishment. Since members of the military elite were neither 
descended from social nor religious leaders, they adopted a 
discourse that replaced family, class, clan and sect loyalties with 
loyalty to the military institution. The army thus became a source 
of influence and asabiyya (clannism) that they safeguarded and 
used to impose their authority in public life. Young officers 
participated in military coups even though they knew that failure 
could destroy their military careers. However, they also knew 
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that success would allow them to move up the ranks and bring 
them closer to the centre of political decision-making. 
Division and conflict among and within political parties at the 
time spread to the military establishment which, by extension, 
witnessed fragmentation and factionalism on the basis of 
politics, loyalties and local affiliations. Following al-Shishakli’s 
rule, several factions based on such affiliations formed within 
the army. These included the al-Shishakli officers’ faction, the 
al-Atassi officers faction, the Druze officers faction, the 
Christian officers faction, and the Damascene ‘Shwam’ officers 
faction, amongst others. These factions have been named in 
many texts and literary works of the time. The diverse 
affiliations of officers and soldiers in the army was rarely a 
source of balance and stability that safeguarded against military 
coups. Instead, these diverging affiliations often led to crises, 
and ultimately caused the formation of a system of military 
rule.98 
During the union with Egypt, al-Nahlawi, a Sunni 
Damascene, assumed a principal military position as Deputy 
Director of Officer Affairs. Through this central position, he was 
able to transfer officers that supported him to army units of 
political and strategic importance. However, this group of 
officers he had formed quickly collapsed during the secessionist 
period. This is partly attributed to al-Nahlawi’s lack of support 
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from non-Damascenes. On March 28, 1962, he tried 
unsuccessfully to regain influence over the army and the 
government through a military coup. After his failed attempt, he 
was exiled with five of his most prominent Damascene officers. 
This led to a state of polarization among Syrian officers between 
Damascenes and non-Damascenes.99 When the situation reached 
a stalemate that threatened violent confrontation, a military 
conference was held in Homs on April 1, 1962 in order to avoid 
bloodshed. The conference was attended by 41 representatives 
from all major military regions and units, which made it 
representative of the identity and common interests of the Syrian 
officer corps at the time. During the conference, Damascene 
Brigadier General Mouti’ al-Samman asked the Secretary-
General of the Ministry of Defence and the representative of the 
Military Command in Damascus to expel six non-Damascene 
officers from Syria, irrespective of their involvement, or lack 
thereof, in the events of March 28, 1962 as compensation for the 
expulsion of Al-Nahlawi and five of his Damascene officers.100 
However, after the attempted coup and the subsequent failed 
movement of January 13, 1963101, al-Nahlawi and his officers 
were exiled and Damascene officers in units charged with 
protecting the capital were transferred to distant units and 
replaced with officers from outside Damascus. In his memoirs, 
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Abdul Karim Zahreddine describes the new officers as “having 
nothing but hatred for Damascus and its people”.102 
Until the early 1960s, factionalism in the military was based 
primarily on political grounds, while sectarian, local and 
regional loyalties played a secondary role. In the 1960s, 
however, features of sectarian and regional factionalism 
surfaced without adequate acknowledgement. According to 
Azmi Bishara, “for social, class, and partisan-political reasons, 
the number of Alawites, Druze and Ismailis was prominent in the 
Ba'ath Military Committee, while the number of Sunni officers 
was more prominent in the conservative Damascene officers and 
the Unionist/Nasserist officers’ groups. There was also a 
considerable number of Christian officers who were in a quasi-
alliance with the Damascene officers. As for independent 
officers, many of them leaned towards a certain faction with 
varying degrees of volatility and changing alliances. However, 
no faction leader presented himself (or his entire faction) on a 
sectarian basis, but on an ideological, political, or professional 
basis.”103 At the same time, familial, local and regional kinships, 
and ukhwat al-dawra (class comradery),104 began to play a role 
in the advent of sectarianism, factionalism and divisions. 
Between July 1963 and February 1966, the Ba'ath was the 
sole ruling party, and conflicts shifted to the military and civilian 
groups within the Ba'ath. Escalation of conflict between the two 
Narratives of Transformation  128 
 
groups reinforced factionalism, assembly, and alignment 
processes, which employed regional, personal, and sectarian 
factors.105  
Officers in command positions helped their relatives and 
those from their sects and regional communities to get into the 
military, naval and air force academies.106 This contributed to the 
increase in the number of minorities in the Syrian officer corps 
over Sunni officers after the coup of March 8, 1963. Ba'athist 
military leaders who took part in the coup were quick to summon 
officers and non-commissioned officers with whom they had 
familial, tribal or regional ties in order to consolidate their new 
positions.107 This method of recruitment was later described in 
Ba’ath Party internal documents as follows: “The difficult 
circumstances of the first revolution prompted the summoning 
of a large number of reserve soldiers (officers and non-
commissioned officers) that were party members and loyalists. 
This was done in order to fill vacancies that arose following the 
purging of the opposition, and to consolidate and protect the 
revolution. The urgency to fill these gaps was accompanied by a 
non-objective and biased recruitment process based on 
friendships, kinships, and even mere acquaintances. This led to 
the infiltration of a number of unfamiliar people who did not 
share the party’s ideology and logic. Soon after overcoming the 
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difficult stage in the revolution, this issue was used as a weapon 
to challenge and question the intentions of some comrades.”108 
 
3.3.  Impact of Regional and International Conflict on 
Instability and Internal Divisions 
After French evacuation in 1946, Syrian politics reflected 
conflict between Arab axes in two ways. Firstly, the National 
Bloc divided into the National Party, affiliated with the Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt axis, and the People's Party, which advocated 
for unity with Iraq. Secondly, the military was deployed by 
affiliates of both axes to serve their respective political interests. 
Husni al-Za’im’s coup served the interests of Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt, followed by those of France and the United States. 
Three weeks after his coup, al-Za’im signed the Syrian French 
monetary agreement in conjunction with a legislative decree. He 
issued another legislative decree on May 16, 1949 for the 
approval of the American Tapline Agreement.109 Conversely, he 
opposed Hashemite unionist plans, which caused relations 
between Syria and Iraq to deteriorate and al-Za’im to lose the 
support of many young unionist soldiers in the army. On the 
other hand, Britain used the federalist projects of Jordan and Iraq 
to pressure France, the United States, and the new regime in 
Damascus to sign an agreement with the Anglo-Iranian 
Company. According to al-Hourani, this explains the Iraqi and 
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Jordanian media campaigns and military mobilisations, King 
Abdullah’s determination to see through plans for Greater Syria, 
and Nuri al-Said’s persistent activities and demands for a union 
between Syria and Iraq.110 This led to a propaganda and military 
campaign between the three countries, which ended with an 
agreement between the United States and Britain to share oil 
interests in Syria. The council of ministers issued an official 
communiqué on June 21, 1949 which ratified the agreement 
between the Syrian government and the Middle East Pipelines 
Company Ltd. and the agreement to establish refineries. The 
following day, the Syrian Newspaper published the entire 
agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Company.111 
On June 25, al-Za’im stated that he had only ratified the 
Tapline Agreement and the Anglo-Iranian Agreement in order to 
provide employment for workers and to protect workers from 
“destructive communism”.112 On June 28, the Damascene 
Victory newspaper published a translated article from the French 
newspaper Le Monde, stating, “Husni al-Za’im was able to 
garner supporters not only with his stance against the 
Hashemites, but also with his anti-communist statements. 
Although he is a supporter of the United States and an opponent 
of the Hashemite family, the British Foreign Office did not 
oppose him because it is in the interest of the British government 
to have control and sovereignty over the oil fields in the Middle 
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East. Therefore, it was faster than the United States in securing 
the right to refine its petroleum products on the shores of the 
Mediterranean Sea”.113 
Sami al-Hinnawi's coup followed suit, with France and the 
United States considering it to have been supported by the Iraqi 
and Jordanian axis as well as the British. This was confirmed 
when a union with Iraq was proposed in government by Hashim 
al-Atassi in September 1949, and supported by Rushdi al-
Kikhya, and Adel al-Azmeh from the People's Party. Akram Al-
Hourani and Khaled Al-Azm opposed unity with Iraq while it 
was subject to a treaty with Britain. This political division spilled 
over into the army, which in turn was divided into factions that 
either supported or opposed unity with Iraq.114 
This Arab division was clearly evident in the new Constituent 
Assembly meetings that took place after the coup of al-Hinnawi 
in December 1949 with the aim of electing a head of state and 
drawing up an interim constitution and the constitutional oath. 
Disputes were centred on the clear proclamation of a republican 
system of government. The opposition that rejected unity with 
Iraq,115 which was under monarchic rule at the time, objected to 
Article 1 of the draft constitution, which stipulates the election 
of a “head of state”. They demanded that the nomenclature be 
replaced with “the president of the republic”. 
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Political disputes over the republican system and unity with 
Iraq spilled over into the military. Republican officers, led by 
Adib al-Shishakli, feared they would be purged by al-Hinnawi 
should the federal project with Iraq succeed. On December 19, 
1949, al-Shishakli and his men launched another military coup. 
It was called the Colonel Movement due to the large number of 
colonels participating in the coup. 
After Shishakli’s downfall, Syria was once again a target for 
Arab interventions. The axis of Saudi Arabia and Egypt 
supported the return of al-Quwatli, while Iraq backed Sabri al-
Asali’s government and its supporters from the army and 
discharged officers. An agreement was reached between the two 
axes on the return of al-Quwatli to the presidency in 1955. The 
decision was supported by Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who 
opposed the ascension of Khaled al-Azm, and his leftist and 
progressive forces, to the presidency. Fearing that Syria would 
veer towards the left, they all preferred a president who had the 
approval of the strongest traditional parties, the National Party 
and the People’s Party, and who would be able to control leftist 
parties and the army.116 However, after al-Quwatli's ascent to 
power, regional axes continued to interfere in Syrian politics by 
preparing for military coups and collaborating with political and 
military affiliates inside Syria. The Baghdad Pact documents 
clearly refer to Iraqi intervention in Syria and to meetings that 
Narratives of Transformation  133 
 
took place between Syrian and Iraqi ministers to create a union 
between the two countries and to disrupt the situation in Syria.117 
Assassinations were carried out, the most critical of which was 
the assassination of Colonel Adnan al-Maliki in 1955. 
In the second half of the 1950s, Syrian politics were 
dominated by the left-wing influences of Arab nationalism, 
which led to unification with Egypt in 1958. Several reasons 
explain this left-wing orientation. Syria was suffering from 
sanctions and the withholding of military aid by Western 
countries, especially Britain and the United States, due to fears 
over hostile Syrian intentions towards neighbouring countries, 
especially Israel. This was also because of Syria’s rejection of 
the Baghdad Pact, followed by its policy of “positive neutrality” 
after the Bandung Conference in April 1955. Furthermore, 
military spending was increasing while development projects 
were progressing at a slow pace. This was accompanied by the 
imposition of Western, Arab and regional pressures on Syria as 
they fought to gain influence over the country. Israeli aggression 
on Syrian lands continued with unlimited Western support, 
Turkey posed a threat to the northern borders, and the Zionist 
lobby in the United States prevented supplies of weapons and 
equipment to the Syrian Army. Therefore, the nascent Syrian 
Republic needed a military force to preserve its borders that 
extended over five hundred kilometres with Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, 
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Palestine and Lebanon, none of whom were on friendly terms 
with Syria. This pushed Syria towards the Eastern Bloc in an 
effort to acquire arms and bypass the arms monopoly imposed 
by France, Britain and the United States on the Middle East.118 
In a pressure move, Turkey mobilized its armies on the Syrian 
border in March 1955. The Soviet Union, in turn, warned Turkey 
that it would not remain idle in the event of a Turkish military 
intervention in Syria. Shortly afterward, an agreement was made 
to sell Czech weapons to Syria due to the West’s continued arms 
embargo and rising tensions with Israel.119 Syria further signed 
a contract with the Soviet Union agreeing to new arms deals 
following Israeli raids and Turkish threats, the reluctance of 
Britain and the United States to supply Syria with weapons as it 
was not party to the Defence Pact, and the refusal of France – 
Syria’s traditional arms provider - to arm the Arabs after the 
Algerian revolution.120 
A combination of other factors further contributed to the 
political and military shift of Syria towards the left. These 
included the tripartite aggression of Britain, France and Israel 
against Egypt in 1956, the Iraqi conspiracy121 in November 1956 
followed by the American conspiracy122 in 1957, the 
disintegration of the Saudi-Egyptian-Syrian Arab alliance, and 
the American media campaign to fight the spread of communism 
in the Middle East and Syria and safeguard Western interests in 
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the region against the Communist threat.123 Syria bypassed the 
Western arms monopoly by signing economic and military 
agreements with the Soviet Union that supplied the Syrian Army 
with weapons and equipment.124 Internally, tensions escalated 
between Saudi and Egyptian-backed Shukri al-Quwatli, and 
Minister of Defence Khalid al-Azm, who was instrumental in 
signing these agreements during his trip to the Soviet Union.125 
The political situation in Syria became increasingly alarming 
towards the end of 1957 as the country was constantly exposed 
to external interferences and threats from neighbouring 
countries. The Communists seemed to be on the verge of seizing 
power after they allied with al-Azm and garnered support from 
the Soviet Union. This prompted the Ba'ath Party to propose a 
federal union with Egypt in December 1957, believing that 
Nasser would frustrate any plans for Communist Party rule. And 
while unity was one of the Ba’ath Party’s leading principles, they 
also believed it would strengthen Syria’s position against 
Western conspiracy efforts. 
Fear and distrust spread among the military elite. After left-
wing officers had reclaimed their positions in the army following 
the insurgency of Qatana on March 17, 1957 aimed at preventing 
their exclusion from leadership positions in the army, and after 
the Damascene officers had been accused, without evidence, of 
being involved in the American conspiracy, it was agreed that a 
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collective leadership termed the ‘Command Council’126 would 
be formed. It consisted of twenty-three officers, from which a 
group was chosen to represent the army in political matters. They 
took part in the Council of Ministers meetings, which were 
convened by the President of the Republic, from 1957 until unity 
with Egypt in 1958. The Command Council consisted of the Afif 
al-Bizri group, who were communist sympathisers and allies of 
al-Azm, and the Amin al-Nafouri and Ahmad Abd al-Karim 
group, who were of the al-Shishakli officers’ faction. Together, 
these two groups formed the al-Bizri/al-Nafouri/Abd al-Karim 
bloc within the Council. They were confronted by the Ba’athist 
officers’ bloc, headed by Mustafa Hamdoun. There was a lack of 
trust between the two blocs, as Ba’athist officers believed that 
al-Shishakli and al-Nafuri group had allied with al-Azm and the 
Communist Party to limit the Ba’ath’s influence in the army. The 
hidden conflict between the two blocs continued until union with 
Egypt, which most believed was the only way to avoid a 
political-military conflict and to overcome competing 
affiliations.  
On the other hand, the national group within the government, 
consisting of the National Party, the Ba'ath Party, independents, 
and communists, were weakened by their disputes. The military 
therefore feared that civilian rule would fail and that politicians 
would fragment the army and exploit it to further their political 
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interests. They also feared that the People's Party would take 
over if the National Party government collapsed. They secretly 
decided, without consulting the government, to offer Abdel 
Nasser a proposal of unity in an effort to avert the impending 
governance crisis in Damascus, and in search of a strong alliance 
that would help overcome disintegration and internal and 
external threats. At the same time, a union with Egypt would 
meet the demands for Arab unity and socialist social reform. 
However, the policies that Nasser pursued in the Northern 
Province, which began with dismantling political parties as a 
precondition for unity, left political leaders without any authority 
in their country. Agrarian reform laws and nationalization 
decrees followed suit, which greatly harmed the interests of the 
landowning and bourgeois classes. Nasser’s policies further 
entailed relocating party officers to ministerial positions in order 
to isolate them from their sphere of influence within the military. 
This exclusion policy was also applied to the civilian Ba'athists 
who came to the realisation that Nasser distrusted them, despite 
their central role in engineering the union. Their ensuing anger 
was directed at the unilateral system of rule and Egyptian 
hegemony over the union, as well as the Ba’ath Party leadership 
for its part in causing their misfortunes.127 Under these 
circumstances, the Military Committee was secretly formed in 
1959. Although most of its founders were of Alawite, Ismaili and 
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Druze origins, sectarianism had little to do with military 
factionalism at the time. Rather, factions were divided along the 
lines of power and politics in the Cold War era.128 
 
4. Military Intervention in Politics and Vice Versa 
4.1. Military and Political Overlap 
One of the most important factors that contributed to political 
instability in Syria at the time was military intervention in 
politics on the one hand, and the political deployment of the 
military in political disputes on the other. 
In practice, the dividing line between civilian-political action 
and military action in Syria had always been fragile. The 
National Bloc had a paramilitary group called the Steel Shirts 
‘al-Qumsan al-Hadidiya’129 sponsored by Fakhri al-Baroudi. It 
was inspired by European fascist forms of organization in terms 
of dress, salute and activity. The group became popular with 
youth across the country, as it spread across Syrian cities as a 
paramilitary wing of the Bloc’s branches. The organisation’s 
central command was headed by Munir al-Ajlani (Secretary-
General) and Saif al-Din al-Ma'mun (Director of Finance). The 
National Bloc had also previously set up the Nationalist Youth 
group in 1929 with encouragement from al-Baroudi, the youth 
patron in Damascus, and was followed by the scouting Umayyad 
Troop. Al-Baroudi believed that the National Movement needed 
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its own militia and built the Umayyad Troop as a prototype for 
the future Syrian National Army.130 
The League of Nationalist Action also had a paramilitary 
group of its own, the Lion Cubs of Arabism, which rivalled the 
Steel Shirts in a manner that mirrored the political rivalry 
between the Bloc and the League. Likewise, Faisal al-Asali 
organized the Socialist Cooperative Party in a militaristic 
manner, training its members to fight, shoot, salute and carry out 
al-Asali's orders without question.131 The Muslim Brotherhood 
also had military factions under the name of the Youth Factions, 
which were dissolved by the military command in January 1952 
during al-Shishakli’s rule.132 Moreover, the Syrian Social 
Nationalist Party had a military wing called the National Jihad 
Forces. 
Alliances between political leaders and military groups were 
commonplace. One of the most important representatives of this 
overlap between civilian and military activity was Akram al-
Hourani. Al-Hourani rubbed shoulders with the army early on 
when he participated in the Rashid Ali al-Kilani revolt in Iraq in 
1941. His relationships within the military expanded during the 
armed conflict to expel the French from Syrian territories in 
1945, and later in 1948 when he led a group of volunteers to fight 
in Palestine accompanied by a number of army officers, 
including Adib al-Shishakli. In his study on the Syrian Army, 
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Michel Van Dusen puts forth that al-Hourani’s main support base 
within the army consisted of officers from the Hama region. He 
classifies them as middle-class fourth generation officers who 
graduated from the Homs Military Academy between 1946-
1952. Some of them politically supported al-Hourani and rallied 
to his leadership, especially the class of 1948, the majority of 
which had local orientations.133 Others merely shared his goal of 
changing feudal society but were not necessarily his allies. 
Al-Hourani saw the army as part of the people and as a 
national institution, and believed the struggle to liberate Syria 
from the French mandate was a joint effort between the people 
and the army.134 He also championed and supported the army in 
Parliament, and urged young people to join the Military 
Academy where al-Hourani, as well as the Ba'ath Party and the 
Syrian Social Nationalist Party, were influential in instilling their 
ideologies.135 For this reason, many politicians, soldiers, and 
researchers in Syrian history, hold al-Hourani responsible for the 
army's politicization after independence. Numerous testimonies 
also confirm his involvement in almost all military coups, 
though he has denied this.136 
In parallel, the military moved past its role as a state 
institution that defended the country against external aggression 
and complied with the government’s political decisions. Instead, 
the military adopted a concept of national security that saw the 
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army as the protector of the nation against external and internal 
enemies alike. In fact, the absence of external threats, in some 
instances, caused the military to carry out its national security 
duties against local political forces it deemed to be a threat to 
internal security and stability.137 Whenever military missions 
became scarce, the army would have surplus capabilities for a 
non-military role.138 This paved the way for the military to 
intervene in politics and control the government whenever it felt 
that conflict between political factions was headed towards a 
government deadlock that would threaten internal security and 
stability.139 Furthermore, military defeat in the 1948 war also 
contributed to the political inclination of the military elite, and 
led to an increase in accusatory discourse between military and 
political elites. Each side blamed the other for losing the war. 
When the army felt that it had become a scapegoat, the military 
decided to overthrow the government, stating that the civilian 
leadership had betrayed them.140 
 
4.2. Mutual Accusatory Discourse 
The military elite built its discourse on two pillars. The first was 
defending the country’s independence and security. The second 
was accusing the political elite of corruption, espionage and 
incompetence, thereby justifying intervention in politics and 
military rule as a ‘legitimate’ alternative. 
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Statement No.1 of Husni al-Za’im’s coup against President 
Quwatli contains the following, “Driven by our patriotic 
jealousy and agonized by the slanders of those who call 
themselves our loyal rulers, we were forced to temporarily take 
over the reins of power in the country [...] Our job is to create a 
truly democratic government to replace the current false one.”141 
After the coup of March 30, 1949, military planes dropped 
political pamphlets over the capital and major cities that read, 
“The valiant Syrian army has seen what the country has come to 
in terms of chaos, lethargy and betrayals, and has found the 
current regime plagued with evils and shamefulness, infidelities 
and thefts, the elimination of democratic freedoms and the 
violation of the constitution and the law. The army saw all this 
and was certain that the nation was marching hastily towards 
death and annihilation. Patriotism, dignity and honour did not 
allow the army to stand idly by and accept humiliation, slavery 
and obliteration as the destiny of a great nation worthy of glory 
and immortality. The army was determined to take an 
honourable stand, and to intervene to restore matters to their 
rightful place, including the nation’s honour, dignity and 
freedom.”142 
On participating in the coup to overthrow Husni al-Za’im, 
Amin Abu Assaf, who was commander of an armoured battalion 
during preparations for the coup against al-Za’im, stated that, “I 
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felt that eliminating the tyrant was the duty of the army alone. 
Had we not done it, we would have betrayed our duty and 
abandoned our country in its most severe internal ordeal.”143 On 
the coup to overthrow al-Hinnawi, Abu Assaf said, "We [the 
military] are adopting the goal of not compromising the 
independence of Syria.”144 
On his second coup, Adib al-Shishakli stated that, “We found 
before us the country's republican system headed towards 
abolition, so we saved it. The military only did what they had to 
when they witnessed the state’s trickery. They meant well by the 
coup and did not intend to cause any harm. Had the army not 
intervened sooner, the country would have been lost.”145 
In fact, the root cause of the problem goes back to the army 
being assigned police duties at home and being used by the 
ruling political elite as a tool to suppress demonstrations and 
unrest to maintain order and stability. In 1948 demonstrations 
and protests swept the country denouncing the defeat in the 
Palestine War and the pervasive corruption in the military and 
various government ministries. There were clashes between 
demonstrators, gendarmerie and police forces. As a result, al-
Quwatli asked Husni al-Za’im to intervene and put an end to the 
widespread unrest. The army thereby took over the duty of 
maintaining public order and security from the police and 
imposed martial law and curfews. 
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The military elite was highly confident and believed it had the 
right to manage its organisation and operations independently. It 
was wary about anything that would affect its privileges and 
status.146 Therefore, transferring the gendarmerie and police 
forces from the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of Interior147 
was a great source of provocation for the army, which considered 
this an attempt by civilians to weaken their influence and 
authority. Consequently, the gendarmerie remained a source of 
tension between the army and civilians for a long time, and it 
was one of the motives for al-Shishakli’s coup in 1951.148 
There was an infamous dispute between the military elite, 
represented by al-Shishakli, and the civilian elite, represented by 
the People's Party, over the removal of the gendarmerie from 
military command and its placement under the control of the 
Ministry of the Interior, and the amending of the laws to the 
Military Tribunals in 1951. Al-Shishakli believed that the 
People's Party wanted to use the gendarmerie to serve their 
electoral interests upon the dissolution of Parliament. He 
rejected the appointment of a civilian Defence Minister,149 
thereby refusing the demands of the People’s Party that sought 
to prevent the military from interfering in state policy. However, 
President Hashim al-Atassi, in agreement with the People’s 
Party, parliamentary parties and independents who supported 
these demands, tried to force the military to accept the situation 
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and form a Council of Ministers where Maarouf al-Dawalibi 
would be both Prime Minister and Defence Minister. Al-Atassi 
also issued a decree linking the gendarmerie with the Ministry 
of Interior.150 Al-Shishakli saw this decision as a challenge to 
himself and the colonels, as it inferred that all commands would 
report directly to President al-Atassi without referring to al-
Shishakli,151 and would effectively remove power from the 
military elite and place it in the hands of the political elite. Al-
Shishakli warned al-Dawalibi that the ministerial list was not 
acceptable to the army, and when al-Dawalibi refused to make 
any changes, the First Brigade marched at dawn on November 
29, 1951 to occupy public facilities and government buildings. 
It then surrounded the Presidential Palace and cut off all 
communication with President al-Atassi. The Prime Minister, his 
government ministers, leaders of the People’s Party and 
members of parliament were arrested and taken to Mezzeh 
Prison. In total, 42 people were detained.152 Al-Shishakli 
continued to pressure al-Dawalibi’s government in prison and 
threatened a military dictatorship if the government did not 
submit its resignation.153 Subsequent decrees were distinctly 
repressive and imposed restrictions and censorship.154 
On the other hand, the military, especially those who 
participated in coups, were accused of espionage and working 
with foreign countries by politicians from the ruling traditional 
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elite and the emerging ideological elite. The Communist Party 
issued a statement on June 25, 1949 urging a boycott of the 
referendum called by Husni al-Za’im, in which it stated, “The 
referendum called by Colonel Husni, servant of American and 
British colonialism, is the biggest travesty in the history of Syria 
[...] He [Husni al-Za’im] has reinforced the control of American, 
British and French colonial powers in our country.”155 The 
Communist Party called the elections that were held under 
military rule “the fake colonial elections.” 
Despite al-Hourani's relationship with the military and his 
frequent role in coups, he accused the military, saying, “The 
military coup of Husni al-Za’im was encouraged by foreign 
actors.”156 He later accused al-Hinnawi and al-Shishakli of the 
same thing. Khalid al-Azm also described the military elite that 
pursued power as “the manic officers, seekers of command and 
control over the country.”157 He accused them of being a tool in 
the hands of the coloniser, and even described them as “slaves”, 
stating, “Thus came Husni Al-Za’im, followed by al-Hinnawi 
and then al-Shishakli. They were each paid for by a foreign 
country to overturn the current situation and establish a new 
regime it could exploit.”158 In his memoirs, al-Azm expressed 
his remorse for accepting the military’s offer to rule several 
times. His justification for cooperating with the officers in 1950 
and 1951 was that he did so not for personal benefit, but to spare 
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the country from military rule. As for 1955 and 1957, he says 
that the officers supported him to spite the People's Party.159 
Not only did al-Azm criticise the officers contending for 
power for their political weakness in government, but he also 
mocked their weak education and cultural levels, calling them, 
“those officers who dropped out of public schools because they 
could not attain their degrees.”160 He also says, “The majority of 
students who failed in preparatory schools scurried to the 
military school. It was attended by every lazy student who 
wanted to evade the long years of study at preparatory schools 
and universities.”161 Thus illustrating that conflict between the 
military and politicians had a class dimension as well. 
The middle-class and poor social backgrounds of the Syrian 
officers led them to adopt a socio-political discourse that 
protected the interests of the social groups to which they 
belonged. They presented themselves as “progressives” in the 
face of “reactionary” class rule. In his book, Hani al-Khair states 
that Adib al-Shishakli “while preparing for Husni al-Zai’m’s 
coup against al-Quwatli, was happy with his mission to take over 
public facilities and government buildings in Damascus, and 
arresting the President of the Republic, that quiet aristocrat.”162 
The military elite presented itself as “progressive” based on 
two factors. The first was proclaiming that the coup was 
“progressive”, since it was a revolution against a system of 
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“conspirators” and reactionaries”. The second was describing 
the modernist constitutional and legal amendments it approved 
in the face of traditional society as the true embodiment of 
“progressive” thought. 
On the fifth day after his coup, Husni al-Zai’m delivered his 
first speech to the people, thanking them for their support, and 
promising to establish a “new progressive regime”163 that draws 
from the people's desires and hopes. He did not mention 
anything, however, about restoring democracy or constitutional 
order. Furthermore, the statement from the military that was 
presented to the people to explain the reasons for the three coups 
in 1949, contained expressions such as “spreading a progressive 
spirit” and “the progressive idea”.164 
The Turkish and Egyptian models of military rule served as 
inspirations for coup leaders. The military, therefore, did not 
view their coups as an attack on authority. Rather, they saw them 
as modernising and progressive movements aimed at reforming 
laws and building a modern state. Under their regimes, religion 
clauses were removed from identity cards, nomadic Bedouins 
were settled, and a central bank was established.165 
Husni Al-Za’im modernized school education and updated 
the curricula of Damascus University. He banned the use of titles 
such as ‘Pasha’ and ‘Bey’ and began the process of removing 
religious endowments and replacing Islamic Sharia law with 
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modern civil, criminal, and commercial laws. He also appointed 
new governors who enjoyed both civil and military authority. Al-
Za’im confronted the traditional Damascene community and 
made away with its extreme and strict religious traditions. He 
publicly declared his indignation at the traditional Arab dress, 
keffiyeh and agal, after which the streets were filled with old 
collections of foreign European hats. Moreover, women 
emerged and participated more freely in public life.166 After Al-
Hinnawi’s coup, the government ratified a new electoral law on 
November 11, 1949, in which the voting age was reduced from 
21 to 18, and women were given the right to vote. The economy 
developed remarkably under al-Shishakli, with notable growth 
in agriculture, industry, and services. Furthermore, Legislative 
Decree No. 87, issued on March 28, 1953, set up the basic 
monetary system and established the Central Bank of Syria.167 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the military considered itself the 
most modern group in society. In principle, the army adopted a 
modern approach and followed modern disciplinary orders. 
They were interested in economic and social reform and adopted 
nationalization policies. Moreover, they fought against 
‘regression’ and ‘imperialism’, according to the jargon used at 
the time.168Thus, it is safe to say that the ‘progressivism’ adopted 
by the military was more concerned with social freedoms than 
political freedoms. This was the basis on which they criticized 
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the ‘reactionary’ ruling class that allowed political freedoms but 
did not adopt radical economic and social reform in order to 
preserve its class interests.   
 
4.3. Exclusions and Purges 
The political history of Syria, from independence to the present 
day, has been characterized by practices of exclusion, 
elimination, and purges among political parties, within the ranks 
of each party, and between politicians and the military. The 
assassination of Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar, leader of the 
People's Party, in 1940 constituted the first political purge.169 
Between 1946 and 1963, Syrian political parties were purged 
and disbanded four times.170 
After independence in 1946, the Syrian government, headed 
by al-Quwatli, took over the ‘Special Troops of the Levant’ from 
France, which numbered approximately thirty thousand 
fighters.171 The Syrian army experienced its first bout of 
factionalism after independence, with rivalry between senior 
officers and young officers. Defence Minister Ahmad al-
Sharabati and his successor al-Quwatli, both supported the 
young officers and sought to discharge the senior officers. This 
was due to the fact that a small number of commanding officers 
had joined the revolution in 1945 against the French, while the 
rest were subsequently handed over to the Syrian government. 
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On the other hand, most of the young officers had joined the 
revolution. Sharabati and Quwatli sought to win the loyalty of 
these young officers, and to discharge the old officers. However, 
the opposition, headed by Akram al-Hourani, believed that with 
the decisive battle for Palestine fast approaching, it was 
necessary to strengthen the army, rather than purge it, by 
reassembling the old guard and introducing conscription laws 
which would provide the army with tens of thousands of young 
soldiers. The opposition’s weakness at the time meant that al-
Quwatli’s decisions would be implemented. Indeed, the mass 
military discharge and weakening of the army cannot be 
overlooked when discussing causes for the 1948 Palestinian 
Nakba and the first coup d’état as well. The military institutions, 
whose pride and dignity were wounded in the 1948 Palestinian 
Nakba, were outraged at the ruling elite and their policies 
towards the army. 
Husni Al-Zai’m explains the reasons behind his coup, stating 
that, “the primary reason was the reprehensible attack on the 
army by Parliament.”172 However, after taking power, al-Za’im 
arbitrarily discharged a large number of officers and soldiers, 
dissolved parties and closed down their offices, and arrested 
political leaders and forced them to issue statements that he 
dictated. Most notable was the letter Michel Aflaq was forced to 
write in prison in which he renounced the Ba’ath Party. Later on, 
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al-Hinnawi's attempts to exclude his fellow officers caused them 
to turn against him and stage a coup. When al-Shishakli came to 
power, he issued Decree No. 1349 on December 27, 1952, 
effective on January 1, 1953, in which he dismissed forty officers 
and commanding officers. He then issued a series of decrees 
restricting the activities of political parties.173 
On the other hand, and driven by the devastation of the 
Palestine War, al-Shishakli focused his efforts on strengthening 
the army and consolidated his relations with the young officers 
to increase his popularity.174 He influenced appointments within 
the army, and placed officers loyal to him in key positions, 
strengthening his control over the security services.175 Al-
Shishakli and his colonels became the nexus of power and 
influence in the country. He removed Chief-of-Staff Anwar 
Bannud, an officer from Aleppo and a relative of Nazim al-
Qudsi, in order to weaken the influence of the People's Party. On 
April 23, 1951, al-Shishakli became Chief-of-Staff, while 
Bannud was appointed military attaché in Ankara, and Fawzi 
Selu was forced to retire after many years of service. 
During al-Shishakli’s rule, policies of exclusion affected the 
Circassian officers Mahmoud Shawkat, who was forced to retire 
and was accused of plotting against the country, and Khalid Jada, 
who was sent into exile with al-Hinnawi to Lebanon in 1950. 
These policies of exclusion were also applied to a number of 
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Christian officers, including Armenian officer Lieutenant 
General Aram Karamanoukian, who was dismissed from the 
artillery regiment after the December 1950 coup, and his 
colleague, officer Bahij al-Kallas, who was tried on charges of 
an attempted military coup. As for Alawite officers, Mohammad 
Maarouf was sent into exile in Lebanon after being imprisoned 
following the coup against al-Hinnawi, Ghassan Jadid was 
removed as head of the Military Police, and Aziz Abdel Karim 
was marginalized. Colonel Mohammad Nasser, Commander of 
the Syrian Air Force, was assassinated on August 1, 1950 by 
unknown persons. On October 30, 1950, Major General al-
Hinnawi was shot in Beirut by Hersho al-Barazi in revenge for 
the death of his cousin, Muhsin al-Barazi. Purges had thus 
expanded beyond political rivalries on Syrian soil, as officers 
increasingly sought to eliminate their opponents abroad.176 Al-
Shishakli’s fiercest confrontation, however, was with the Druze, 
where the military was deployed. Mansur al-Atrash, a Druze 
Ba’athist and son of Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, leader of the Syrian 
revolution in 1925, distributed anti-Shishkali leaflets in Sweida 
in late January 1954 following arrests at anti-Shishakli student 
and party demonstrations. He was thereby arrested, which 
caused protests to erupt in Sweida and shootings took place. Al-
Shishakli sent military reinforcements along with Hajjana forces 
from the Arabs of the Lajat, who were firmly hostile and 
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vengeful towards Jabal al-Druze. The army entered Sweida 
where bloody confrontations took place, and the Druze 
delegation in Damascus which included Prince Hasan al-Atrash 
was arrested. A special force was also sent to arrest Sultan Pasha 
al-Atrash, forcing him and his comrades to seek refuge in Jordan 
after attempting to resist.177 This explains the strong presence of 
Druze politicians and officers in the subsequent coup against al-
Shishakli. 
Al-Shishakli was not overthrown by a pure civil revolution 
that broke with the military approach and its violation of the field 
of politics, but rather by a joint military-political movement that 
allowed the military to maintain its influence in politics. Al-
Shishakli's rule ended on February 25, 1954 and was followed 
by a period of instability that lasted nearly four years. The 
intense struggle between political parties hindered the formation 
of ministries several times. Several political parties were purged, 
including the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, which was 
dissolved on April 22, 1955, after being accused of assassinating 
Colonel Adnan al-Maliki. The National Party was also dissolved 
in the fall of 1956, after accusations of involvement in the Iraqi-
British conspiracy, which aimed at establishing a union between 
Syria and Iraq.178  
The political diversity and pluralism of the 1950s in Syria was 
reflected in the military through its the various factions and 
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divisions. The army was no longer divided along sectarian lines 
as it had been before independence. Divisions, rather, became 
governed by internal political rivalries and external 
interferences, as Syria had become the epicentre for regional and 
international conflicts between axes and their intelligence 
services. As a result of this partisanship and rivalry, the military 
elite has endured massive exterminations since independence 
and until this day, and has witnessed discharges and forced 
retirements, imprisonment, exile, and assassinations. Al-Azm 
refers to this issue in his memoirs, saying, “Thus, no more than 
twelve years had passed until the number of discharged officers 
exceeded that of officers in active duty. If we examine the upper 
class, that is, the colonels and above, we find that it has been 
purged, leaving only the junior officers who do not yet possess 
the experience necessary to take over command of the army and 
its units.”179 
Each coup leader eliminated senior officers that had been 
instated prior to their coup. This practice continued even during 
civilian rule in an effort to consolidate command positions in the 
army. Alliances between the military and party leaders 
contributed to these practices, as did relations with conflicting 
foreign axes over Syria. 
The assassination of Adnan al-Maliki in 1955 was a turning 
point in Syrian politics that impacted the military and political 
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elites. In November 1956, a year after al-Maliki’s assassination, 
a coup attempt was made by a group of Syrian officers in 
cooperation with Iraq. Eight members of Parliament, a number 
of army officers and members of the Syrian Social Nationalist 
Party were accused of conspiring with Iraq to stage a military 
coup and overthrow left-wing rule.180 These two events, the 
assassination of al-Maliki and the ‘Iraqi conspiracy’, contributed 
to the strengthening of the position of Ba’athist officers and their 
left-wing allies who objected to the reduction of death sentences 
issued against those accused of the Iraqi conspiracy. 
In an effort to diffuse tensions within the army, Shukri al-
Quwatli and Chief-of-Staff Tawfiq Nizam al-Din moved more 
than a hundred left-wing officers away from their support base 
in the army. Moreover, new appointments were made that 
reinforced the support base of Damascene officers loyal to al-
Quwatli and al-Shishakli and weakened the left. These measures 
prompted Ba’athist officers to coordinate with the party 
leadership (Aflaq, al-Bitar and al-Hourani), to launch the Qatana 
insurrection on March 17, 1957.181 
In August 1957, Radio Damascus announced the discovery of 
a plot designed by the CIA to overthrow the government in Syria. 
As a result, the American diplomatic mission was expelled from 
Damascus,182 and Afif al-Bizri, a Soviet sympathizer, was 
appointed as Chief- of-Staff. He discharged high-ranking 
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Damascene officers and formed a command council consisting 
of Ba’athists and al-Shishakli officers, despite the lack of trust 
between the two groups. This mistrust became further 
entrenched after the al-Bizri and al-Shishakali factions allied 
with the Khalid al-Azm parliamentary bloc and the Communist 
Party to diminish Ba’athist influence in the army.183 
In late 1957 and early 1958, Syrian politicians found 
themselves either subjected to or allied with military factions 
whose differences reflected the raging political and ideological 
rivalry. The Damascene Officers faction, led by Suheil al-Ashi, 
was affiliated with al-Quwatli and hostile to al-Hourani, the 
Ba'ath Party, and the left-wing and progressives in general. The 
faction of Amin al-Nafuri, Ahmad Abd al-Karim, Ahmad 
Hanidi, and Touma Awadallah was affiliated with al-Shishakli 
faction and hostile to al-Hourani and the Ba’ath, although some 
of them developed left-wing tendencies later on. The Afif al-
Bizri and Communist Officers faction was mainly composed of 
Palestinians. The last faction consisted of Mustafa Hamdoun, 
Abdul Ghani Qanoot, and Ba’ath officers loyal to Akram al-
Hourani. It was apparent that the political-military struggle 
would lead Syria into a bloody conflict. The military believed 
that the only solution was unity with Egypt, as it would put an 
end to these partisanships and protect Syria from the increasing 
foreign threats at its borders. 
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During the union with Egypt, both politicians and the military 
experienced the largest number relocations, exclusions, and 
discharges. After first dissolving political parties, Abdel Nasser 
then turned his attention to the military institution, the more 
dangerous of the two, in his opinion, as it had been the source of 
coups. He relocated senior officers to political positions of 
ministers, advisors and ambassadors to distance them from 
military command. The rest were sent on diplomatic and 
exchange missions. Egyptian officers thus ruled Syria, while 
Syrian officers fell prey to disguised unemployment in Egypt. 
Abdel Nasser excluded most Ba’athist and Communist officers. 
He dismissed al-Bizri one month into the union and discharged 
or relocated minority officers to Egypt or other civilian jobs, 
sparing only the Damascene Officers faction which would later 
turn against him and overthrow the union. Research into the 
history of the Syrian military institution shows that one of the 
many reasons that incited the coup against Abdel Nasser was his 
dismissal of a large number of officers.  
After secession from the union, a new phase of factionalism 
and conflict began between those loyal to Nasser and the union, 
and those opposed to it. Political instability driven by 
intermittent coup attempts led to a constant change in 
government and the suspension of Parliament. Such was the case 
on March 28 - April 1, 1962, when the Damascene Officers 
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(officers of the September 28 Movement) overthrew the civilian 
government they had initially instated. This subsequently 
weakened their influence and that of many Christian officers, 
especially after the Homs conference on April 10, 1962, which 
exiled Damascene officers leading the coup. Under these 
circumstances, the army divided once again into several factions 
along partisan lines: Arab Nationalists, Ba’athist Officers, the 
September 28 Officers, and Nasserist Officers.184 
On January 11, 1963, al-Nahlawi secretly returned with his 
comrades from exile to stage a coup in liaison with the 
Nasserists. On January 13, an insurgency took place in the 
Qatana, Qaboun and al-Kiswah185 military camps in support of 
al-Nahlawi, prompting Colonel Ziad al-Hariri to move his forces 
on the Golan front towards Damascus, which was about to fall 
into a state of chaos brought on by these rival factions. When 
politicians tried to mediate a solution to the conflict, al-Nahlawi 
presented his demands which included the reinstatement of him 
and his comrades in the army, the trial of those involved in the 
Aleppo insurgency of April 1962, and the call for immediate and 
conditional unity with Egypt. President Nazim al-Qudsi met 
with al-Nahlawi and his comrades and reached an amicable 
agreement with them to leave Syria, while the Army Command 
issued a decision on March 1 to appoint al-Hariri military attaché 
in Baghdad. The failure of the remaining Damascene Officers 
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cleared the stage for the Ba’athist and Nasserist factions and 
their independent allies. This prompted Colonel Ziad Hariri, 
allied with Nasserist officers and the Military Committee, to 
seize power on March 8, 1963. Afterward, failure of the tripartite 
unity pact between Egypt, Syria and Iraq in April 1963, 
accelerated the conflict between Ba’athists and Nasserists over 
power. This culminated in a bloody clash on July 18, 1963, 
following the failed coup attempt of Nasserist officer Jasim 
Alwan.186 The Ba’ath Party and Military Committee thereby 
pursued a bloody path to monopolize power. 
 
4.4. From Political to Sectarian Factionalism 
After the coup of March 8, 1963, the military fell into a web of 
partisan and sectarian divides and witnessed unprecedented 
campaigns of eliminations and discharges on charges of 
separatism, bourgeoisie sympathies, populism, and subservience 
to al-Hourani. A few days after the coup, 500 officers from 
trained and professional army cadres were discharged, to be 
replaced by reserve officers who were party members, teachers 
and employees. Luay al-Atassi and Fahd al-Shaer point out that 
in the tripartite unity talks held on March 3, 1963,187 discharges 
and purges targeted those affiliated with the Syrian Social 
Nationalist Party, the Communist Party, Kurds, Circassians, 
security officers in the Ministry of Interior and students at the 
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Military Academy, where an entire class was dismissed on the 
pretext that its students were secessionists. The Lebanese 
newspaper, Al-Hayat, published a list of discharges and reported 
on figures, “104 senior Syrian officers have been discharged, 
while 400 other officers are at their homes awaiting a 
decision.”188 
Nasserist officers also faced discharges, which caused 
demonstrations to break out. The offices and newspaper of the 
Arab Nationalists were closed down, and its members either fled 
or were arrested and subsequently given long prison 
sentences.189 The public sector was purged of Nasserists and 
their loyalists, who were, in turn, replaced by Ba’athists. 
The Military Committee purged the civilian political wing of 
the Ba’ath, political rivals such as Nasserists, and a group of 
independent officers affiliated with Major General Ziad Hariri, 
relocating 25 of his supporters. It was then consumed by internal 
struggles for power among its factions at the expense of what 
was left of the Syrian Army, which was divided in 1964 into four 
blocs along sectarian, regional and clannist lines: 
 
• Major General Salah Jadid's bloc consisted of Alawite officers, 
some officers of the Masyaf and Salamiyah districts, including 
Abdul Karim al-Jundi, and the left-wing civilian Ba’athists of 
the Regional Command. 
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• Major General Muhammad Umran’s bloc competed against 
Salah Jadid and Amin Al-Hafiz for the presidency, garnering 
support from Alawite officers, and semi-Nasserist civilians. 
Umran simultaneously approached the Damascene right-wing 
and Gamal Abdel Nasser. 
• Officer Salim Hatum's bloc constituted a small centre of power 
in the army with the support of Jabal al-Druze officers. 
• Amin al-Hafiz’s bloc comprised of Sunni officers.190 
 
The first conflict between these rivalling blocs arose between 
Salah Jadid and Muhammad Umran. Despite their common 
sectarian background, their orientations and alliances were 
different. Umran allied with Salah al-Bitar, the prime minister 
and member of the National Command, who sought to cooperate 
with the merchants of Damascus, the Syrian right, the Ba’athists, 
and the Nasserists, and to garner Arab support for his 
government. They stood against the coalition of Major General 
Salah Jadid, the Regional Command and the left-wing military. 
Umran lost his military base after Salah Jadid took control of the 
70th Brigade in Qatana. He submitted his resignation and was 
appointed Syria's ambassador to Spain in December 1964. 
Umran’s loyal officers were transferred away from various 
command branches, and some were dispatched on a military 
mission to Moscow. Umran was later assassinated in Lebanon 
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on March 14, 1972. The second conflict was the coup against 
Amin al-Hafez and the National Command on February 2, 1966, 
which was followed by the exile of twelve officers and the purge 
of over ninety officers of various ranks, less than a year and a 
half before the June War, on charges of collusion with Amin al-
Hafez. A number of officers were also discharged on account of 
belonging to the bourgeoisie. A popular class background 
became a condition for joining the army. Foreign Minister 
Ibrahim Makhous said to Akher Sa’a magazine in late June 1966: 
“The party is the base, and the army, like all institutions, must be 
organized in a partisan manner, as it is a popular sector that 
participates in elections and is therefore subject to political 
leadership. Which is why bourgeois officers were discharged 
and popular descent became a condition for enrolment in the 
Military Academy.”191 Salim Hatum, who played an executive 
role in the coup against Amin al-Hafez, found himself and 
officers of his bloc and sect, including civilians and soldiers, not 
only without promotion, but also facing discharges and purges. 
Hatum launched a failed coup against Salah Jadid, the result of 
which was the purge of two hundred Druze officers from the 
Syrian Army. Fahd Al-Sha’ir and Hatum were arrested and 
sentenced to death. Hatum died under torture.  
Patrick Seale describes the situation after these purges as 
follows, “Assad, as Defence Minister, agreed to dismiss some 
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400 officers in the largest cleansing campaign in the history of 
the Syrian Army. He and Jadid were determined to put an end to 
sectarianism once and for all. If these are added to the many 
Nasserists and secessionists who were discharged or arrested 
since 1963, it becomes clear that Syria had tumbled in the June 
War without an officer corps, or at least with a corps that was 
greatly depleted.”192 The American Time magazine also 
published an article in January 1967 containing a description of 
the state of the Syrian Army. It stated: “The Syrian forces are 
shamefully deficient because more than half their officers have 
been targeted by the purge. The brigadiers of today were captains 
no more than three years ago. More so, a third of the Syrian 
Army is stationed in Damascus to support and protect the 
regime.”193 
Between July 1963 and February 1966, the conflict between 
the military wing and the civilian wing of the Ba’ath Party 
expanded factionalism along regional, personal and sectarian 
lines.194 The conflict within the Ba’ath Party after 1963 was not 
a mere struggle between the right and the left, where the left 
proved victorious. According to Ghassan Salamé, it was instead 
a struggle between the utopian unionists for whom secession was 
a source of guilt, and a new pragmatic group that accepted the 
existing borders between Arab countries and whose organization 
relied on local-sectarian affiliations and a modern army. Hence, 
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the defeat of Aflaq and al-Bitar in 1966 constituted a victory for 
the countryside over the city, for the minority over a fragile 
alliance between the majority and minorities, for the military 
over civilians, for pragmatism over utopia, and for the army over 
the party, the latter of which then became a tool in the hands of 
the army for propaganda, mobilization and cementing 
legitimacy.195 
The only members of the Military Committee left standing 
were Salah Jadid and Abdul Karim al-Jundi on one side, and 
Hafez al-Assad and his brother Rifaat al-Assad on the other. The 
latter established the Defence Companies (unit 569) that Hafez 
al-Assad subsequently used to confront Salah Jadid, seize power 
and destroy the influence of Abdul Karim al-Jundi. Starting in 
the mid-1960s, the military elite pursued a policy of building an 
‘ideological army’, which blurred the divisions between Salah 
Jadid’s bloc, Muhammad Umran’s bloc, and Hafez al-Assad’s 
bloc. The army became a central pillar of the regime, which in 
turn took the form of a “party-army intermarriage or 
coexistence” rather than pure military rule.196 Eventually, al-
Assad managed to purge his rivals and seize power in what he 
called the ‘Corrective Movement’ on November 16, 1970. 
Launching a military coup would not be an easy feat after 
1970. Military spending rose to 13.7% of GDP,197 while the 
regime exerted oversight and increased surveillance to prevent 
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any coups. It strengthened the Ba’athist politicised armed forces 
and tightened its grip over security and intelligence apparatuses. 
Furthermore, promotions and discharges were issued based on 
the assessment of kinships and degree of loyalty to the regime. 
Another factor, identified by Roger Owen, was the application 
of Soviet concepts in organization and military tactics, which 
strengthened the regime’s control over the officer corps and 
significantly limited the real power of division commanders.198 
The military elite also sought to integrate itself with the 
technocrats, state bourgeoisie and commercial bourgeoisie. This 
made it difficult for these groups to rebel against the status quo. 
Following the Corrective Movement in 1970, the military was 
subjected to two parallel policies. The first aimed at improving 
its combat capabilities, which proved effective in the 1973 War, 
and the second aimed at preventing this combat capability from 
crossing over the predefined political line. This was guaranteed 
by reserving key and sensitive positions for relatives, friends and 
fellow sect members, and marginalizing traditional Alawite 
leaderships in favour of new Alawite senior officers.199 
Moreover, parallel paramilitary forces, such as the Republican 
Guard and the Defence Companies, were formed.200 The affinity 
between the ruling sect, the army and the state grew stronger in 
the 1970s. This was evident in the new tasks that were assigned 
to the army, other than fighting Israel, the most prominent of 
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which was the intervention in Lebanon in 1976, 1982, and 1983, 
and quelling the insurgency of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria 
in 1978-1982. It is noteworthy that these new tasks did not result 
in any insurgencies or mass desertions within the Syrian Army, 
which remained firm and resolute.201  
The military institution and the Syrian state were redefined 
following the events of the 1980s. The purge of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the ensuing war for power between the al-
Assad brothers was followed by civil and military discharges and 
purges. In 1983, Hafez al-Assad had become the one and 
‘eternal’ leader of Syria, propagated by political literature, 
official speech, slogans and pictures that covered the streets and 
state institutions. The most prominent slogan was “Our Eternal 
Leader, Hafez al-Assad”. The Republican Guard replaced the 
Defence Companies, and officers in the security apparatus were 
allocated positions according to their Alawite clan origins. 
Policies on sectarian and ethnic quotas in Parliament, party 
groups, local administrations and ministries were extended to 
include all sects and ethnicities, not only Alawites. 
The dividing line disappeared between politics and the 
military in terms of them being two separate institutions 
competing for power and distinct in ideology and class, as had 
been the case after independence. Al-Assad succeeded in 
establishing a strong presidential rule. He held the reins of power 
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by taking control of the three centers of authority in Syria: the 
party (as its secretary general), appointing and dissolving 
governments, and the leadership of the armed forces and the 
military which became Ba’athist.202 This led the presidency to 
control the whole of society, supported by civilian-military 
alliances, Alawite followers and relatives in security and military 
command positions, as well as the urban Sunni bourgeoisie, 
especially in Damascus. 
 
Conclusion 
Political elites in post-independence Syria were shaped by two 
main factors: the struggle with colonialism, and modernity. Most 
political elites and parties emerged during the French mandate, 
and their objectives and agendas revolved around resisting 
foreign occupation and striving for national independence. After 
independence, the struggle against the ‘foreign other’ remained 
the source of legitimacy for these elites, especially with regard 
to the Palestinian Cause, ongoing regional threats and colonial 
projects in the region, such as the Baghdad Pact. Internally, 
however, these elites entered into a political struggle over 
modernity and the social, economic and constitutional issues of 
the newly independent state. 
The traditional elite that took power after independence 
constituted a class of landowners, notables, merchants and 
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industrialists that fought in the struggle for independence, that 
is, the upper class that held political, economic and social 
influence. It was distinguished by its ethnic and religious 
diversity, with a clear Sunni Muslim majority, which united 
under the banner of an Arab identity and a national-liberal 
project. Its political orientations geared towards democracy and 
liberalism, and centred around the parliamentary system, 
constitution and individual freedoms. It was inspired by the 
Western European democratic political system. However, unlike 
its Western European counterparts, it failed to form a political 
class in the absence of a real class struggle. Economic growth 
during the mandate period and post-independence was not strong 
enough to bring about a modern economy led by an economic 
bourgeoisie which supported the emergence of a political 
bourgeoisie. Instead, the economic and political bourgeoisie in 
Syria merged to form the ruling class.  
The traditional ruling elite did not follow a clear ideology and 
political agenda and did not break with traditional society. On 
the contrary, it invested in local loyalties and leaderships in an 
effort to build alliances and strengthen its influence, especially 
during elections. It failed to gain the confidence of the masses, 
which paved the way for the military to enter politics as 
representatives of the masses and the interests of the middle and 
poor classes. On the other hand, emerging ideological parties 
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also failed to rally the vast majority of the masses. Independence, 
therefore, remained fragile as the intelligentsia and petty 
bourgeoisie concerned themselves with issues of national and 
political struggles while the masses were ignored. The masses 
were left without radical working or peasant class leaderships, 
as Yassin al-Hafez puts it,203 and the Nasser leadership simply 
filled this vacuum. This situation also expanded military 
influence. 
On the other hand, the conflict between the Arab axes over 
expanding influence in Syria, the Cold War, the 1948 defeat in 
the Palestine War, and the internal struggle over economic and 
social modernization projects contributed to the fragmentation 
and division of the traditional ruling elite. This made way for the 
emergence of a new elite that adopted multiple ideologies 
including Arab nationalism, Syrian nationalism, Marxism, and 
Islamism. The emerging ideological elite included members of 
the middle class and the upper middle class. It acquired 
legitimacy through its ideologies that opposed the ruling class, 
colonialism and imperialism alike. This made it symbolically 
powerful and appealing to the military, with whom it would form 
alliances. Furthermore, it possessed strong intellectual capital, as 
its members had attended Western universities and were 
influenced by European modernity. 
Narratives of Transformation  171 
 
The ruling elite failed to keep up with economic and social 
developments that accelerated post-independence and failed to 
deal with the mounting threat of the emerging ideological elite 
who exerted pressure through protests and demonstrations. This 
forced it to reorganize its priorities and revise its plans for 
democracy that began under the French mandate. The mandate 
had hindered the establishment of a solid foundation for a 
democratic parliamentary system, which remained fragile and a 
weak version of the Western parliamentary system. This allowed 
for successive military interventions and coups that obstructed 
the political constitution. 
The first generation of military elites that engineered 
successive coups between 1949 and 1954 was formed within the 
French mandate’s Special Troops. It descended from the middle 
and poor classes of ethnic and religious minorities who rebelled 
against urban civilian rule. This generation received a modest 
French secondary education, and thereby enjoyed limited 
intellectual capital. In the second half of the 1950s, a second 
generation of military elites emerged, which was moulded within 
national education and military institutions. It was therefore 
more politicized and radical, dividing the army into factions that 
mirrored the diversity in politics. Members of this generation 
mostly came from rural families of non-landowning farmers, 
with a few descendants of rural notables and civil servants. 
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Despite their modest education and origins, they were influenced 
by nationalist and socialist ideologies, and sought to improve 
their social and political status, which they achieved in 1963. 
Disagreements between political and military institutions 
from independence until 1963 revolved around the following set 
of points: the position on military armament and the military’s 
role in politics; unitary projects between Syria and countries in 
the region, and associated impacts on the republican system; the 
social question, class struggle, the peasant issue and the socialist 
system; the legitimacy of the ruling elites; the position on 
continuous foreign interferences and conflict of regional axes; 
military intervention in politics; political deployment of the 
military in political conflicts; mutual accusations of corruption; 
and issues surrounding notions of progressivism, reactionism, 
patriotism, reform and revolution. 
In light of social divisions over notions of ‘identity’ and ‘the 
national state’, the diversity of sectarian and regional ties and 
loyalties, and foreign interferences, the military found itself the 
most organized, qualified and representative national institution. 
It believed it had the right to participate in politics since it was 
the protector of national security and unity against external and 
internal enemies alike. Its ability to launch a series of coups is 
attributed to the failure of civilian political authority to contain 
the military establishment, to neutralize it from interfering with 
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politics, and to approach it as a state institution subject to the 
existing political system. The coups were launched under the 
pretence of defending the republican system and implementing 
progressive economic and social reforms. It took advantage of 
political instability caused by external regional factors and 
internal political factionalism.  
It can also be inferred that in the absence of an institutionally 
dominant political elite, that is, a hegemonic bourgeoisie, armed 
forces will tend to seize power and dominate society. This 
process of appropriation is carried out in the name of 
‘development’, by adopting radical social and economic reforms 
or “revolutions from above” as described by Gramsci and 
Trimberger,204 and later by Raymond Hinnebush in his study 
Syria the Revolution from Above.205 In Syria, the goal was to 
strengthen military rule and limit the power and influence of the 
traditional ruling elite, made up of notables and landowners, 
especially since the majority of military officers came from poor 
rural backgrounds and would stand to benefit from agrarian 
reform and nationalisation policies. In Syria, Egypt, Iraq, 
Algeria and Sudan, the military adopted socialist and left-wing 
political programs in their struggle against the traditional elite. 
These political systems emulated those of Turkey’s Ataturk and 
Egypt’s Abdel Nasser, thereby earning the name “populist 
nationalism”.206 However, these new regimes, which built their 
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discourses on equality and integration of the lower and middle 
classes in the struggle against the old hegemonic elite, were not 
‘populist’ in terms of representing the people's interests. Rather, 
their intrinsic contradiction lies in their quest to mobilize the 
masses and control them at the same time.207  
It can therefore be reasoned that since the military’s conflict 
with the traditional ruling elite was on a class and ideological 
basis, then its conflict with other ideological elites, with similar 
social backgrounds and left-wing socialist orientations, was 
primarily over strategies and methods of social, political and 
economic change. And second, it was a struggle for power. This 
explains the suppression of other ideological groups and the 
struggle to monopolize power. 
On the other hand, the failure to establish a truly democratic 
civilian state, from independence until the present day, has 
prevented the establishment of a truly independent military 
institution. Moreover, the failure of politicians to establish a 
functioning state apparatus, and the military’s mistrust of 
politicians due to the latter’s partisan and power struggles that 
disregard public interest, prompted the army to repeatedly 
intervene in politics, under the pretext of protecting the country's 
independence and unity. As a result, however, these 
interventions impeded the consolidation of the emerging 
national state and overthrew its nascent semi-democratic system, 
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which could have been the beginning of a pluralist democratic 
system and a developed constitution. 
The French mandate established an army that was fragmented 
along sectarian, tribal and ethnic divisions. In the period between 
independence and the early 1960s, the most politically pluralist 
phase in Syrian history, the army was politicized and divided 
between blocs and factions. Ideological affiliation was 
predominant, and politics was an integral part of public life. 
Competition between political and military elites was primarily 
on a political and ideological basis that was, at times, guided by 
local affiliations. The structure of the ruling elite radically 
changed in the 1960s, as previously marginalised social groups 
came to power. The semi-democratic system post-independence 
allowed them to enter schools and military academies and join 
radical parties. Consequently, political parties that rose to power 
followed a national socialist discourse and adopted policies of 
nationalisation and agrarian reform, thus shifting the centre of 
power and influence from the city to the countryside under the 
slogan of socialism. In addition, the army was subject to 
‘Ba’athification’ under the guise of creating an “ideological 
army,” with factionalism taking on an implicit sectarian and 
regional form. Under al-Asad, the military blended with the state 
and the ruling sect, as the regime tightened its control over 
society, the state and its institutions. Although Parliament was 
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nominally representational of Syrian society, representatives 
could not be channels of communication between the people and 
the state, as their allocation was governed by their degree of 
loyalty to the regime. The same applies to other positions within 
political and military institutions. 
Throughout these different stages of Syria’s contemporary 
history, consistent processes of exclusion and purges between 
and within the military and politics continued to exhaust both 
institutions. This led to an abandonment of the semi-democratic 
system, pluralism, and individual and press freedoms. In return, 
the military paid the price for internal and external political 
conflicts with its officers and soldiers, when it integrated itself 
into political processes and became one of the competing interest 
groups, instead of abiding by its duties to repel external 
aggression and protect state sovereignty. 
Today, a hundred years after the establishment of modern 
Syria, multiple regimes, and decades of overlap and conflict 
between the military and politics, where each side adopted a 
discourse that gave itself legitimacy under slogans of patriotism 
and protecting the interests of the people and the country, 
everyone seems to have lost. Political and military factionalism 
has expanded, with politics entering the realm of armament and 
military practices, and the military being plagued with 
politicization and sectarianism. Today more than ever before, 
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Syria is an arena for regional and international conflict and 
foreign intervention. There has been no consensus on an 
inclusive national identity, and no constitutional government 
subject to separation of powers has been established. By 
assessing the histories of both political and military institutions 
in Syria, this study has sought to contribute to a future that learns 
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